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24 June 1981

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COMMENTATOR ATTACKS FOREIGN MINISTER OLESEN ON TNF STAND

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 14 May 81 p 3

[Commentary by INFORMATION correspondent Jorgen Dragsdahl: "However, Only Kjeld Olesen Was Right"]

[Text] Washington, D.C. May 1981--Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen has made important contributions to putting the debate on security policy on a higher level in Denmark, and it is encouraging, for example, to read the following from the minister's hand in the April issue of NY POLITIK:

"Naturally, a critical condition which must be satisfied if our security policy is to have the intended effect is that the population must agree with it. For this to be the case, it is also necessary that the problems of security policy, which often are difficult to comprehend, are adequately explained and made the subject of debate, both on the political level and in public."

Kjeld Olesen has a great responsibility, personally, in that connection. He has a group of competent civil servants at his disposal. His knowledge is the result of an access to the political process on a high level which no other Danish "debaters" have. To a very great extent, statements coming from him can influence the Danes' perception of the surrounding world.

Therefore it is with surprise and regret that I read his contribution to this paper which was published on 15 April and which was brought forth by a series of questions addressed to him in his position as a leader. It naturally is not beneficial that earlier statements by the minister had not been reported in INFORMATION, but it is regrettable that, when invited to do so, he did not satisfy the deficiency by answering the questions that were asked. Even more regrettable is the fact that the minister's reaction is a counterattack which apparently is in disagreement with the actual conditions.

Brezhnev's Proposal of a Moratorium

The minister says he is surprised that I did not keep myself informed in regard to what he said in the Folketing concerning the subject of missiles. Actually, I did do so, and that was precisely the reason for my question.

On 1 April, Kjeld Olesen answered a question from Gert Petersen, who wanted to get an explanation of the minister's attitude toward Brezhnev's proposal of a moratorium. Part of his answer is repeated in the minister's article which was published in this paper. I considered it superficial, and consequently I wanted an amplification, but what is most serious is the fact that the minister, in the Folketing, called Brezhnev's proposal "something very positive," saying that we should get down to business, take hold and investigate further. Immediately afterward, the Foreign Ministry was contacted by the American charge d'affaires, who apparently was concerned over the minister's favorable attitude toward Brezhnev's idea of a moratorium. Ambassador Dyvig replied that the foreign minister had spoken without a manuscript. The next thing that happened was that, in his article in this paper, the minister limited "the positive aspect" to Brezhnev's conciliatory tone in presenting his proposal. I continue to think that the minister owes us all a more detailed explanation--that can be accomplished by responding to the concrete points which were mentioned in INFORMATION's two leading articles on 28 March and 13 April. The question is even more important since the minister became a co-signer of a NATO statement which totally rejected Brezhnev's proposal. What is the reason for his changed attitude?

But perhaps the confusion is owing to the fact that Kjeld Olesen has access to a version of Brezhnev's speech which differs from the one the rest of us have.

In the foreign minister's article in INFORMATION, he states that it is "necessary for one to know precisely what one is talking about all the time" in that connection. Thereafter he writes that, at the party congress in Prague, Brezhnev stated that "the two parties should stop all preparations (the minister's underlining) for the deployment of TNF [Theater Forces] weapons."

On 8 April, the NEW YORK TIMES printed the relevant portion of Brezhnev's speech. The moratorium proposal which had been put forward earlier was presented again and amplified in the following lines:

"The unrestricted nuclear-weapons race in Europe is becoming mortally dangerous for all the people in Europe. With regard to a way of beginning to arrive at a practical solution to that problem, we proposed that, at least for a period of time, nothing be added to what already exists, so that a stop could be put to further deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles and the replacement of both Soviet and NATO medium-range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe.

"That naturally includes the American advanced nuclear systems in that area. The moratorium could be in force until a permanent treaty was entered into for limiting and, even better, for reducing the above-mentioned nuclear weapons on both sides in Europe.

"Of course our proposal of a moratorium is not an objective in itself. It came up with reference to the creation of a more favorable atmosphere for negotiations. It is our belief that the objective on this question--I have said it before and am repeating it now--is specifically to reduce, on both sides, the quantity of nuclear weapons which have been accumulated in Europe. It is entirely possible to do that without damaging either the East's or the West's security situation."

Perhaps Kjeld Olesen has another version of the speech in which the word "preparations" is inserted in a central location, but apparently the minister made a mistake in reading the proposal.

Helmut Schmidt's Speeches

The matter does not get any better when Kjeld Olesen has to "call Jorgen Dragsdahl's attention to the fact that he is mistaken when he thinks that there is agreement between Brezhnev's speech at the party congress in Prague on a moratorium and Helmut Schmidt's statements in April 1980." Kjeld Olesen writes that Helmut Schmidt was talking about "a temporary moratorium which could include deployment." (Deployment means stationing).

It should already be clear by now that there actually is agreement, but here are two excerpts from Schmidt's speeches in that connection. The quotations are taken from a report to the Foreign Policy Committee in the House of Representatives: "The Modernization of NATO's Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces", dated 31 December 1980.

On 11 April 1980, during a speech in Essen, Schmidt said, "It would be a step in the right direction if both parties simultaneously would abstain from deploying new, or more, medium-range missiles for a certain number of years. I admit that the Soviet Union's previously-existing lead would remain during that period, but that would be the case anyhow for at least the next 3 years."

On the next day, he went a step further when he stated that he desired a discontinuation of actual production. "A first step toward arriving at a solution for this critical situation might be for both sides simultaneously to abstain from producing many new or more modern medium-range missiles for a certain number of years, so that the intervening period of years could be used for negotiations concerning bilateral limitations--limitation in equilibrium and on a lower level." As Kjeld Olesen mentions, that is a very intricate complex of problems, so that I will be grateful if he can point out how I am mistaken when I see an agreement between Brezhnev's and Schmidt's statements. To me, it continues to look like Brezhnev's speech is a carbon copy of quotations from Schmidt.

Poland

Naturally, it is a serious matter for a journalist if he makes a mistake, and, more particularly, it is a serious matter if a foreign minister is behind the accusations. However, I actually would like to be mistaken. Schmidt's, Olesen's and NATO's apparent attitude on this matter raises such serious questions, as a matter of fact, that I would prefer to believe that such apparent misleading of opinion and opportunistic propaganda, which would be repudiated if the adversaries accepted, was reserved exclusively for the leaders in the Kremlin.

Kjeld Olesen also thinks I am mistaken in my interpretation of the statement resulting from the meeting of defense ministers in NATO's nuclear planning group on 9 April. I wrote that its wording signified a change in a Western policy which had been maintained over a period of many years when it linked TNF negotiations with the Soviet Union's behavior toward Poland.

The minister writes that the NATO council's meeting in December 1980 produced a statement in which it was said that "it will not be possible for detente to survive if the Soviet Union intervenes in Poland" and that he therefore does not perceive any change in the West's policy.

The minister must be aware that there is more than a difference in shades of meaning between "detente" and "arms control." Detente includes trade, various kinds of exchange and the general atmosphere in social and commercial intercourse. Arms control consists of negotiations which take as their starting point the fact that there is a clash of interests between the parties involved which is so serious that enormous military apparatuses are constantly being developed and that armament effort can run wild--hence the agreements. The minister's own view is, somewhat self-contradictorily, in his article, that an intervention "does not need to lead to a cessation of efforts to promote arms control measures." That view is in agreement with the policy which guided the Carter administration's efforts within the field of arms control. Since arms control is in both party's interests, irrelevant conditions cannot be put forward, and even a Soviet invasion of Poland would not alter the nuclear situation. Linking control negotiations to invasions (Afghanistan), for example, and wars (Vietnam and Angola, for example) has not been either the United States' or NATO's policy for more than 10 years. The concluding statement from the NATO ministers' meeting on 11 and 12 December 1980, then, is also in agreement with that tradition. It is pointed out that detente cannot survive if the Kremlin infringes on the basic rights of nations again, but that occurs in a section where the phrase "arms control" is not even mentioned, and in Section 12, which deals with negotiations concerning nuclear weapons in Europe, there is no "linkage" or threats.

The situation is different where the statement which Luns read aloud after the defense ministers' meeting on 8 April is concerned. In that statement, it was said that "the Soviet Union would seriously undermine the basis for effective arms control negotiations if it intervenes in Poland's internal affairs." Secretary of Defense Weinburger subsequently stated at a press conference regarding the timing of negotiations: "The date depends entirely on the Soviet Union's behavior in the coming weeks and months." Luns supported that pronouncement: "The date does not depend upon the United States; it depends upon the Soviet Union." Several American newspapers called that statement a victory for Reagan's policy of linking things together, and Weinburger repeated his interpretation several times--even going so far as to say that even pressure on Poland would prevent the beginning of negotiations.

Furthermore, if the phrase in question was not so serious, how can it be that, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, West Germany completely rejected a repetition of linkage of arms control and Soviet policy toward Poland together at the most recent meeting of the foreign ministers? And doesn't it bother the minister that Haig, when he got back to Washington, said that he had presented Reagan's foreign policy and "it received unanimous, enthusiastic support from all the member states?" Are people not aware that that NATO meeting consolidated an ominous switch in the United States foreign policy to a frightening extent?

These are certainly complicated questions, but just for that very reason unfounded accusations are not in keeping with a fruitful debate in a democracy.

9266

CSO: 3106/121

OLESEN DEFENDS STAND ON TNF, NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 May 81 p 4

[Article by Flemming Ytzen: "Denmark Put Pressure on the United States and Got New Negotiations on Nuclear Missiles in Europe"]

[Text] Does Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen speak with two tongues, and for domestic and foreign consumption?

This question is being brought up because the minister's statements on arms control in Europe have been understood and construed differently. Kjeld Olesen's attitude toward the NATO resolution of December 1979 on the production and deployment of 572 medium-range missiles in Western Europe was interpreted by the NEW YORK TIMES as if the foreign minister were almost an unqualified supporter of the missile project. Kjeld Olesen was already able to contradict that assessment the day after INFORMATION repeated the information published in the NEW YORK TIMES.

Since then, NATO has held a meeting of foreign ministers in Rome, where the missile resolution and the possibility of carrying on negotiations on arms control with the Soviet Union were precisely what constituted the central subject under discussion. The result of the NATO meeting was described as a compromise: namely, that the West European allies would declare their support for the United States' foreign and defense policies and Reagan and Haig would accept new negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear missiles in Europe. The concluding statement resulting from the NATO meeting was also to the effect that NATO would make it a condition for promoting better East-West relations that the Soviet Union "would stop bringing about and exploiting crises and instability in the Third World." In other words, the condition under which NATO would be willing to discuss disarmament with the Soviet Union would be for the Russians to change over to a foreign policy which the United States and the West could accept--even in areas which lie outside of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's traditional areas of interest.

Pressure on the United States

"Kjeld Olesen, when many American newspapers construe the results of the NATO meeting of foreign ministers as a clear victory for Reagan's and Haig's hard foreign policy line, are they interpreting the situation correctly?" he was asked. "Trying to decide who has won a victory and who has not serves no useful purpose," the foreign minister replied. "Both for Denmark and for many other NATO countries, the entirely decisive point at the council meeting was that we should get new negotiations

on nuclear missiles in Europe. We would not have gotten that result if pressure had not been put upon the United States. In my conversations with Secretary of State Haig, I told him about the attitudes which emerged in the Danish debate on nuclear missiles, and I also informed him regarding the meetings involving several European Social Democratic parties which had been held--on a party level--in which we indicated very clearly that we wanted negotiations on a limitation of the new missile systems based on a realistic view of the existing situation. The NATO resolution of 1979 on the deployment of 572 missiles also actually implied a desire for new discussions looking toward negotiations within the framework of the SALT process. Now, SALT 2 has never been ratified by the United States, and that is why we had to repeat and stress our desire for new negotiations as soon as possible and with a view to having such negotiations form a part of an additional SALT process if it is pursued further. What happened at the Rome meeting is actually what the Danish government has been working hard to obtain ever since December 1979," said Kjeld Olesen.

The Concluding Statement

The concluding statement from the Rome meeting was construed by several prominent American daily newspapers as supporting and confirming Reagan's and Haig's foreign policy. The WASHINGTON POST stressed that the statement implied precisely the linkage of two possibilities as if one were dependent upon the other. This is contained in the proposals of those who advocate that the West should only cooperate with the Soviet Union on the question of arms control on the condition that the West is satisfied with the Kremlin's general behavior where foreign policy is concerned. The BALTIMORE SUN called the concluding statement's "sharply anti-Soviet wording" the toughest treatment accorded Soviet behavior by NATO in a number of years.

Kjeld Olesen evaluates the concluding statement as follows: "There is an essential difference between the original draft and what finally resulted from it. It was very important to us for detente to be included in that communique. That was a desire of ours which we pushed very hard--supported by Norway--and we are glad we succeeded in putting it across. "But I also must say--and particularly to INFORMATION, which has put pressure on the government so many times to get the Americans involved in genuine negotiations--that your mention of precisely that important point must be described as a modest one," he said.

"So you regard the result of the meeting as a victory for the Western European line in the security debate, in contrast with the idea the American press conveyed?" he was asked.

"The United States government accepted a very clearly expressed request from its European allies," he replied. "I would hesitate to call it a victory, for there is something fulsome in that expression. The fact is that we carry on a running dialogue in NATO, and that dialogue now has led to an American acceptance of a European request."

"Is it a correct assessment of the situation to say that a European acceptance and approval of Reagan's and Haig's foreign policy was the price that was paid for getting new negotiations on arms control?" he was asked.

"The entire discussion of the international situation naturally was the dominating point at the meeting," Minister Olesen replied. "I myself pointed out that one cannot be content to criticize the Soviet Union for infiltrating the Third World, for the Western countries must make sure that they are systematic in their relations with the Third World--that is, enter the dialogue between North and South actively in a different way than is the case just now. For that matter, I definitely cannot conclude from the concluding statement and the discussions at the NATO meeting that we are unequivocally lining up with the Reagan administration's foreign policy here. Let me give a concrete example.

"At the most recent NATO Council meeting, when the Polish situation was discussed, it was stated that if a Soviet intervention in Poland took place detente could not survive. I tried at the time--but in vain--to get the wording changed, for it seemed too strong to me."

Linking Negotiations With Soviet Foreign Policy

"I tried an altered wording to the effect that intervention in Poland would mean a catastrophic setback for detente. If you look at the actual communique, you will not see the wording to the effect that detente would not survive," he said.

"But is it really a fact that NATO now is consistently linking negotiations on arms control with Soviet foreign policy in general?" he was asked.

"It is true that there are remarks in the concluding statement concerning linkage and in my opinion that is not so strange, after all," said Minister Olesen, "for if the situation should arise which we all hope will not, that naturally will affect any planning that is done among nations and any possible relations among nations."

"But do you think that it will advance efforts at disarmament to promise that negotiations will be the Russians' reward for good behavior?" he was asked.

"No, it should not be something we give the Soviet Union," he said. "For detente to continue is something which is in our own interest. I have put it in the following way: 'Bridges should not be broken down, but should be used!'"

"The concluding statement actually called Brezhnev's moratorium proposal (Editor's Note: a proposal that the expansion of nuclear weapons systems in Europe be halted temporarily) unacceptable. Do you share that view?" he was asked.

"In the Folketing, I spoke favorably of Brezhnev's speech at the party congress," the minister answered. "Before his speech, it was generally expected that the temperature of international relations would drop off a few more degrees. Therefore I was able to evaluate what emerged from the Soviet party congress as something positive, but, as a matter of fact, the contents of the moratorium proposal are something we must examine more closely.

"If the situation is that the West must halt all plans for expansion while at the same time the Soviet Union has doubled the number of its SS-20's--that is, its advanced nuclear missiles--since the December 1979 resolution, then I find it unacceptable.

"The situation is that more than 225 SS-20's have been deployed as of the present moment. It is calculated that two-thirds of them are aimed at European territory. At the same time, I think the question of a moratorium is a bit theoretical as long as it will not be until the end of 1983 that NATO can begin deploying its missiles. That means that there is time to carry out the negotiating process. In reality, a sort of moratorium does exist on the Western side because the NATO missiles cannot be deployed before 1983, whereas it is an open question whether the Russians will continue to deploy another SS-20 every week. The word moratorium is a very theoretical construction. The critical point for us is for the United States and the Soviet Union to get to the negotiating table as quickly as possible and arrive at a result before the end of 1983."

Brezhnev's Speech

"Does that mean that you interpret Brezhnev's move as something like a statement of intention which NATO has been able to make use of in spite of everything?" he was asked.

"The NATO meeting's resolution regarding new negotiations, regardless of the substance of Brezhnev's proposal, can be regarded as a favorable answer to the Soviet Union, in any case. The fact is that the situation since December 1979 has been that the United States has tried to contact the Russians 11 times. It was not until Helmut Schmidt has been in Moscow and had talked with Brezhnev that the Russians were inclined to agree to the meeting which took place in Geneva in December, where something like outpost skirmishing and reconnaissance work went on. Then came Brezhnev's surprising speech, followed by pressure from the smaller European countries, and I will state here, immodestly, that Denmark certainly was not the last in the field in that effort. That was what brought about the situation in which Haig was able to state that they then were ready for negotiations. Those are the facts of the case," said Kjeld Olesen.

"Are you not afraid that NATO's policy with respect to the Soviets of linking two possibilities together as if one were dependent upon the other will interfere with the efforts for which you would think you had prepared the way if it were not for that policy?" he was asked.

"As the situation is now, we have prepared the way for negotiations on the European nuclear missiles. If something should happen which would contribute to the deterioration of the international atmosphere, it is obvious that would also affect the atmosphere surrounding those negotiations. That possible result cannot be ignored. Depending upon what happens in those circumstances, we naturally have to guess how we would react, but fundamentally we will have to maintain that bridges must not be broken down," he said.

"Statements from the NATO Council meeting also say that modernization of NATO's nuclear weapons is more necessary than ever. How can that tally with the fine intentions you believe you have promoted?" he was asked.

"In December 1979," Minister Olesen replied, "there actually was something like an equilibrium between East and West with regard to nuclear weapons. Since then, on the Eastern side, a doubling of the aforementioned SS-20's has taken place. If

that situation continues to develop in the same way, the West will be obliged to follow their lead in order to maintain a balance. But if negotiations get started, we will hope that by 1983 we can observe that it is no longer a question of deploying 572 NATO missiles but that, instead, the number of nuclear weapons has been cut down--that is, if a reduction of the SS-20's also takes place. I am a supporter of either solution, but I favor the latter one. I am in agreement with Brezhnev when he says that a balance continues to be necessary, but at a lower level."

Helmut Schmidt

"How do you interpret the statements of Helmut Schmidt when he said, on 11 April, that it would be a step in the right direction for both parties simultaneously to abstain from deploying new medium-range missiles or more medium-range missiles for a certain number of years? Doesn't that agree with Brezhnev's proposal?" he was asked.

"Brezhnev's proposal was to the effect that if the Russians would abstain from deploying SS-20's the West should halt its development of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.

There is an essential difference when Helmut Schmidt says that both parties should abstain from deploying missiles," he said.

"Is there full agreement between your views on guided missiles and those expressed by the Dutch and Belgian Social Democrats?" he was asked.

"The Dutch and Belgians are in a situation where missiles are to be stationed on their territory, and we do not have that problem. At its recent congress, the Dutch Labor Party decided to oppose the stationing of nuclear missiles on Dutch soil. The Belgian party believes that the question of deploying missiles should be linked with the negotiations people now are trying to get started. If the negotiations produce results, they will take a position on the basis of the existing situation. Thus, there are slight differences. My opinion is the one we all share: that we should exert pressure to start negotiations as quickly as possible," said Kjeld Olesen.

"Do you think that the opponents of guided missiles are playing into the hands of the Soviet Union?" he was asked. "No, I do not think that," he replied, "but what do we mean by the expression 'opponents of guided missiles?' I have no doubt that the Russians make the most of the fact that we in the West have an open society where opinions clash and where politicians are kept up to the mark by the public. You don't see as much open debate or very many letters to the editor in PRAVDA, do you?"

"But naturally every citizen must ask himself what it is that we are developing when the world uses \$500 billion for arms and only \$30 billion for assistance to underdeveloped countries. The people who ask such questions are in the process of pushing developments in the right direction, and that effect is what we politicians need."

Area Free of Nuclear Weapons

"Has the government's vision of the North as an area free of nuclear weapons not changed in recent times?" he was asked.

"Our view continues to coincide with the Norwegian view. We still see no reason why a treaty should be drawn up concerning a situation which quite simply already exists, and we maintain that the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic Sea must be included," said Minister Kjeld Olesen.

"We are ready, in the North, to become parties to a broader solution regarding an area free of nuclear weapons because, quite simply, we are in the situation we are in. I also have observed that PRAVDA does not agree with our view, but we must insist that the Baltic Sea and the Kola Peninsula have significance for the Scandinavian region."

9266

CSO: 3106/121

SOVIET WANTS GREENLAND IN NORDIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

Gedthab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 7 May 81 p 8

[Text] A Soviet commentator has raised the question why Greenland is not included in the proposed nuclear-free zone.

The Norwegian government has submitted a proposal to create a Nordic nuclear-free zone, but has not mentioned Greenland in that connection.

"Could that be considered an admission of the fact there are already American nuclear weapons on Greenland?" Soviet commentator Poljukov Aleksander asked in an article featured in "Facts About the Soviet Union." "If that is the case, it must be brought out in the open," he added.

"It seems illogical not to include Greenland in a possible nuclear-free zone and if this is an oversight, it must be corrected," Poljukov added and continued:

"The crash of an American B-52 bomber near Thule and the disclosure that this base is used for planes carrying nuclear bombs, together with the nuclear reactor? accident at Camp Century Base, suggest that Greenland cannot be classed as an entirely nuclear-free area. Since Greenland is part of the Danish kingdom and thus a member of NATO and the EEC, it should not be excluded from the nuclear-free zone," according to the Soviet commentator.

Even though Poljukov favors the Norwegian proposal, he admits that the Soviet Union cannot go along with the crucial part of the proposal, namely that the Soviet portion of the Baltic and the entire Kila Peninsula be included in the nuclear-free zone.

8952

CSO: 3106/123

AF GENERAL OBLESER ON CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 May 81 p 2

/Report by fy., datelined Bonn, 28 May7

/Text7 The effects of the financial crisis on the air force are so devastating that SPD deputies in the defense committee last Wednesday asked Air Force Inspector Obleser why he had not yet resigned. Deputy Horn made a point of reminding the AF general of his oath and promise to defend the Federal Republic from injury. Following this he asked Obleser how he could have accepted the deterioration and restrictions on the Luftwaffe generally. Opposition deputies were similarly bewildered. The cause of all this was Obleser's testimony as witness before the Bundestag investigating committee charged with providing an explanation of the "Tornado" debacle and its possible effects. Obleser testified as follows:

1. While the air force is able to fully meet its obligation for aerial defense, "peak efficiency" is no longer attainable.
2. In case of war the Luftwaffe doubts whether it would be able to use its own air bases, due to the absence of weapons for effectively defending these facilities from attacks by hostile aircraft. The "Roland" type missile systems necessary to do so are not being purchased due to the lack of funds. At the arms review they were deleted from the plans.
3. The cuts and savings decided upon in early at the arms review headed by Defense Minister Apel did not take into consideration the analysis of a possible threat or study the question in how far the discharge of responsibilities would still be possible after the cuts.
4. Neither in the course of the review nor subsequently did Defense Minister Apel consult the AF inspector to find out about the consequences on the Luftwaffe's ability to meet its obligations in view of the loss of equipment to deal with certain dangers.
5. The review was exclusively preoccupied with so cutting weapons plans as to allow for their implementation with the resources expected to be available in the next 5 years. It was geared solely to what appeared financially feasible, not to that which would be necessary to constitute a credible deterrent to Soviet threats. The

armed forces were issued a planning framework based on zero growth of defense spending. Apel did not even require clarification of what would be the necessary minimum from the aspects of "threat" and "compliance with responsibilities."

Practice Flights Well Below NATO Requirements

6. Even after the increase in the defense budget by another DM850 million to a total of DM42 billion, the Luftwaffe does not have enough fuel. 1981 supplies are well below the 777,000 cubic meters of jet fuel it got annually up to 1979, and which it needs so that combat pilots may practice for the 180 flying hours set by NATO as necessary. In 1980 the Luftwaffe already received no more than 677,000 cubic meters of jet fuel. Annual flying hours per Luftwaffe pilot duly fell to 168. This year, despite the supplementary budget, pilots will be able to be in the air only from 126-135 hours. Comparison with the figures published by the allies demonstrates that the Luftwaffe has thereby arrived at a situation hazardous to combat readiness as well as to flight safety. Obleser reported the following hours flown by allied pilots in 1980: Belgium 175, Canada 243, the Netherlands 219, Britain 219 and the United States 198. Flying hours for American pilots have actually been raised to 220 this year. The Luftwaffe was already quite deficient in 1980, at 168 flying hours.

In summation Obleser arrived at the verdict that NATO requirements on the capacity of the Luftwaffe had been fully met up to 1979. At the present time compliance is restricted, and these restrictions will become even more pronounced in future. The inspector described Luftwaffe morale and combat readiness as "excellent." However, this appraisal was not applicable to equipment, "least of all" with regard to the future.

At the start of his testimony Obleser said that he considered the "Tornado" indispensable, regardless of the costs and difficulties involved in its production and procurement. He said that he had so informed Apel in a letter dated 17 November last--when the financing deficit of DM1.33 billion was certainly known to the minister. Obleser admitted that there had been mistakes with regard to the financing of the aircraft (something for which he is not responsible). In early 1980 both the Luftwaffe and the navy were aware that money would be lacking for the "Tornado" in the 1980 and 1981 budgets. At a planning conference called for 31 January 1980 to settle this problem, system agent Ambos had demonstrated the additional needs. However, the head of the budget section had contradicted him.

Some surprise greeted the fact that not until 8 January last, that is in his 3rd year as defense minister, did Apel request Obleser to brief him on the details of the "Tornado" and its problems. Obleser did not exclude the possibility that Apel may have been exhaustively informed by the system agent for the "Tornado" or the weapons section. When CDU deputy Woerner pointed out that this behavior was exceedingly odd in view of the fact that in 1980 the newspapers had been replete with "Tornado" reports, Obleser said that Apel had asked him for a general briefing about the program and the status of the project in June 1980, but this had not included any details.

More questions resulted from the fact that Obleser, while producing a plethora of reports and documents and thereby calling the attention of the Bundestag leadership to the "Tornado" problem, had failed to approach Apel personally in order to acquaint

him with the difficulties. In answer to questioning by deputy committee chairman Corterier, Obleser said he believed he had provided sufficient documents for the leadership. It would have been standard procedure for the leadership to have asked for further elucidation. Since that did not happen, he had assumed that the omission "was deliberate."

SPD deputy Wuers queried why Obleser had not used his right to approach Apel directly or to threaten resignation unless the minister remedied the defects. The inspector countered that he had a right to report to the minister but not the right to resign his post. He had indicated the problem in many written reports. He had interpreted Apel's failure to react as meaning that this neglect was deliberate. Incidentally "a lot of other people" should have had to brief the minister earlier.

As the members of the investigating committee obviously thought that they had not discovered the real reasons for Obleser's failure to present a direct report to the minister, they reserved the right to summon the general once more.

11698

CSO: 3103/321

BRIEFS

LABOR YOUTH ON NNWFZ—"Naturally, an area free of nuclear weapons in the North cannot include the Kola Peninsula. The Kola Peninsula is of quite crucial importance in the strategic balance between the superpowers, and the proposal of such a nuclear-weapon-free area can never result in the upsetting of such a balance," said the chairman of the Workers' Youth Phalanx, Eigil Knudsen, at the election rally of the South Trøndelag Labor Party in Orkdal on Sunday. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 May 81 p 4] 9266

CS0: 3108/44

AKREP NALAN TAKEN INTO CUSTODY

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 18 May 81 pp 1, 15

[Excerpts] Security forces in Istanbul have brought down in a single large sweep the illegal organization named the Turkish Peoples Liberation Party Front/Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Union-Revolutionary Liberation (TPLPF/MLAPU-RL), to which the fanatic terrorist "Akrep Nalan" belongs. It was revealed that the 78 terrorists, 13 of whom are women, which were taken into custody had killed 37 people in Istanbul, including 3 policemen, had injured 18 people and set up many armed robberies. During the series of operations, the terrorist Ibrahim Ozalp was killed in an armed clash with police, and 33 of the terrorists who carried out the organization's actions are still at large.

Found by police in the searches conducted of the cell houses of the organization's agents, many of whom were arrested in earlier operations and are now in prison, were 2 Kalashnikovs, 1 "Akrep," 1 MAT automatic pistol, 38 pistols of various calibers and makes, 100 ammunition clips, 1,500 shells, 1 military-issue hand grenade, 5 bombs, electric primers, masks, copying machines and typewriters, false identifications, identity cards, licenses, embossed stamps and seals which they had used in actions and also a portion of the money and gold they had stolen.

It is understood that 19 of the arrested organization members are workers, 11 are students, 1 is a teacher, 7 are college graduates, 4 are civil servants, 1 is a printer, 3 are travel agents and 29 are independent professionals.

Also seized by police as a result of the operations were regional committee members of the illegal TPLPF/MLAPU-RL for Esenler, Tozkoparan, Gungoren, Bayrampasa, Parseller, Kadikoy, Goztepe and Bakirkoy. The organization's militants reportedly were responsible for the Hippodrome robbery, robbery of an ambulance carrying the payroll to Cerrahpasa Hospital, the murder of four Americans in Atakoy, murder of NAP Zeytinburnu District chairman and, finally, the assault on six Americans in Fikirtepe. Police authorities also reported that 33 of the organization's militants are still being sought.

Akrep Nalan

The police also arrested Nalan Gurates, the fanatic terrorist known within the organization by the codename "Akrep Nalan" who had carried out many bloody incidents without batting an eye. "Akrep Nalan," who participated in murder, bank and business robberies, police station attacks and distribution of booby-trapped posters and who spread death with a fully automatic "Akrep" rifle, was reportedly a brain of the organization.

Police authorities said that "Akrep Nalan" was the organization's Kadikoy officer and announced that he had been arrested while making plans for a series of bloody actions in Istanbul. The "Akrep" gun which "Akrep Nalan" used without batting an eye was seized in a search of his house. Police authorities said they did not have a chance to seize "Akrep" Nalan's gun during the operation.

Bloody Actions

Some of the bloody actions carried out in Istanbul by the dismantled illegal MLAPU-RL are:

--22 February 1978, robbery of the Monopoly Sales Depot in Kartaltepe, Bakirkoy; a guard was killed and the director was wounded.

--16 March 1978, Chief Superintendent of Police Ugur Gur and two police officers wounded in Fatih Prefecture.

--16 June 1978, Robbery of the Jockey Club at the Hippodrome in Bakirkoy, five persons killed including two policemen.

--2 March 1979, Robbery of the payroll vehicle belonging to Cerrahpasa Hospital, payroll officer killed.

--5 May 1979, Murder of American corporal in Atakoy, two enlisted men wounded.

--29 June 1979, Murder of NAP Zeytinburnu District Chairman Bekir Sendilli, his son and two friends wounded.

--14 February 1979, Murder of four Americans in Atakoy.

--2 January 1980, Murder of an Israeli airlines director in Kocasinan.

--30 June 1980, Murder of Police Officer Muzaffer Uz in Tozkoparan.

--5 December 1980, Robbery of one of four jewelry stores in Cennet Precinct, Kucukcekmece.

--6 April 1981, Assault on six Americans in Fikirtepe.

The illegal organization's militants reportedly carried out many more actions of murders, woundings, robberies, assaults and distribution of booby-trapped posters in addition to these.

8349

CSO: 4907/277

ENEL TO BUILD WIND POWER PLANT IN SASSARI

Sassari LA NUOVA SARDEGNA in Italian 12 May 81 p 9

[Text] The wind power plant which the ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] had requested permission to build in the Fiume Santo zone will be built. The municipality's Building Commission has formally approved the plan submitted by ENEL toward the end of last year.

The plant, consisting of 10 "windmills," will be an experimental one. It will be capable of developing a total power of 500 kilowatts. The plan drawn up by ENEL stems from the premise that not enough energy is being produced in Italy. The latter fact is one of the principal reasons for such frequent blackouts as are being experienced.

The ENEL experiment is part of a detailed program of research efforts being directed to the use of alternative energy sources. The zone in which the plant is to be built, because of its particular atmospheric characteristics, appears to offer the probability of good results.

The experiment has to do with the exploitation of wind power through a system of aerogenerators, machines which in substance perform the same function as windmills. They consist of a supporting tower (15 meters high) equipped with three blades actuated by the force of the wind.

The 10 aerogenerators will be installed in an area extending over 25 hectares owned by the municipality. The zone is situated in an area that flanks the old provincial road to Stintino. The "windmills" will probably be spaced out over an area of 10 hectares, along three parallel lines; they will be installed equidistant one from the other to form two hexagonal figures.

According to the ENEL plan, the energy produced by the aerogenerators will be fed into the normal 15,000-volt electric power lines. The plan was presented in January by an official of the Agency, engineer Ballicu, to Mayor Pietro Montresori, Deputy Mayor Nino Piretta, and Councilmen Pietro Era and Teuccio Bargella.

These administration officials indicated at that same meeting that they were prepared to make available the area in which the engineers were asking to build the plant. ENEL's engineers requested authorization at the same time to put up a 1,000-cubic meter building to house supportive services and equipment for the plant.

The system devised by ENEL would enable the recovery of energy without causing pollution. It would be, in fact, an alternative energy source of a nature to protect the environment. The electric power is 50 kilowatt-hours.

When the plan was submitted to the administration officials as above, these representatives of the municipality took the opportunity offered by the meeting to set forth the need to build six additional transformer stations in the city to satisfy the requirements generated by the recent urbanizations. The mayor, deputy mayor and councilmen agreed then to cede to ENEL the necessary areas.

9399

CSO: 3104/276

FRG ATOMIC POWER FACILITY REPORTEDLY INTERESTS GOVERNMENT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 5 Jun 81 p 12

[Text] Ankara (Special)--Turkey has approached West Germany in connection with the setting-up of an atomic power station, which is one of the most important undertakings aimed at solving the energy problem. This undertaking, initiated by Serbulent Bingol, the minister of energy and natural resources, concerns the atomic facility which Germany prepared for delivery to Iran in accordance with an agreement made during the time of the Shah. This facility, with machinery and equipment complete and crated, remained in the hands of the Germans following the revolution in Iran. The Khomeyni government declared that they did not want the atomic power station.

During the Ecevit government period, the atomic power station undertaking which Turkey initiated with Sweden did not lead to anything even though Sweden agreed to provide the appropriate credit and agreed to undertake construction. After waiting for quite a long while, the Swedish Government canceled the credit.

Following this, it is reported that the French showed interest in setting up an atomic power station in Turkey. In fact, this subject was discussed during the official visit to Paris of Foreign Minister Turkmen.

The Turkish government believes that, following this month's general elections in France and Sweden, some light can be shed on the matter of constructing a nuclear power station in Turkey and that it will be possible to initiate steps to establish a consortium.

CSO: 4654/17

BRIEFS

ELECTRICAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION--Electrical energy consumption in Turkey last year reached 23.3 billion kilowatt/hours. According to a report on this topic contained in GORUS, the monthly publication of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, this amount is 3.5 percent greater than that for 1979. In the report, which stated that per capita consumption had been determined to be 435 kilowatt/hours, it was indicated that the end of 1979, the percentage of the population utilizing electrical energy had reached 63.2 percent from approximately 34.2 percent in 1970. The report indicated that 37 percent of our country's population was unable to make use of electrical energy. The report gave the following information concerning the breakdown of per capita electrical energy consumption. According to calculations made assuming an average for Turkey of 100, the Marmara and Aegean regions exceed the average with 180 and 125 respectively. The lowest consumption was noted in east and southeast Anatolia (27). The report further notes that, in the breakdown by consumer groups, as of the end of 1979, 75 percent of electrical energy consumed was utilized by industry, and 18.7 percent by homes and commercial establishments. The lowest consumption was for street lighting. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 5 Jun 81 p 11]

CSO: 4654/19

GIRAUD INTERVIEWED ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 16 Apr 81 pp 36-38

[Interview with Andre Giraud, Minister of Industry, by Alain Pauche]

[Excerpts] [Question] L'USINE NOUVELLE: A 7-year plan is drawing to a close. It has been marked by industrial phenomena which differ widely from those experienced or produced by the subsidized reconstruction of the years just after World War II, or by the expansion and consumption of the DeGaulle era. These past few months, a new wave of concentrations has again modified the industrial landscape. Do you think you have contributed to the birth of a more competitive industrial climate and, if so, how long do you think it will last?

[Answer] More competitive--that's obvious. No one can maintain that French industry is less competitive than it was several years ago. I will limit myself to reminding you that industrial exports grew by 35 percent and productivity by 5.1 percent. There is hardly a country in the world which can boast of such a performance, outside of Japan.

[Question] What was your contribution?

[Answer] I would first like to mention the three major positions of our industrial policy. First, there is the reaffirmation of the role of business and of the heads of those businesses in deciding what that company is going to do. Since the world changes quickly, a return to the spirit of free enterprise is fundamental if one wishes to achieve maximum effectiveness. The second position consists in helping the basic industries (steel, textiles, and automobiles), those industries which are assets, and which employ thousands of workers and represent billions of francs in investments--helping them to be competitive. The third principle--the conquest of new industries--assumes two aspects: incitatory in the realm of data processing and directional in the areas of nuclear energy and space exploration.

[Question] Does this system appear to you to be well suited to the situation in France?

[Answer] What appears to me to be well suited to it is the state of thought on the respective roles of business and government. And I say "thought" on purpose--and not necessarily of the current situation which is still marked by too many administrative constraints. From this point of view, the present situation cannot

be considered satisfying. On the other hand, I think we have found a balance with the business world. If the government is responsible for strategic interventions in business, the responsibility for those interventions, once they are expressed and followed, lies at the level of the heads of these businesses. It is difficult to understand how a government can be indifferent to the revolution in electronics and in automation.

[Question] On this point, do you think you have been understood?

[Answer] Yes. The nature of relations set up between the industrial world and the government are more or less satisfactory. The true role of the Minister of Industry is to cooperate with the business world to insure the development of industrial policy. Nevertheless, the effort at regionalization that we have undertaken is still insufficient. It is true, though, that we started at zero, the government being totally centralized 3 years ago. We succeeded in what concerns the saving of energy. Somewhat less so in a certain number of economic stimuli.

[Question] Did you succeed in helping the 50,000 small and medium-sized companies which employ more than six workers? Didn't you rather concern yourself with Boussac, Usinor, Creusot-Loire, GPM or Matra, to the detriment of the small and medium-sized companies?

[Answer] To the detriment, certainly not! We were more concerned with the small and medium-sized companies than with large companies, even though contacts are easier with the large ones. What was done in favor of the small and medium-sized companies was considerable, although the measures were relatively spread out, and therefore more difficult to characterize. Even a partial enumeration of the decisions in favor of the small and medium-sized companies is significant: setting up of the Agency for the Creation of Businesses, creation of guarantee funds, tax incentives, exemption from the professional tax and from the tax on newly formed small and medium-sized companies, creation of the special desk (oh how it was fought!), regionalization of the assistance given by the National Agency for the Valorization of Research (80 percent of the dossiers approved were submitted by small and medium size companies), creation of equipment credits for small and medium-sized businesses, and reduction of the terms of payment of public transactions.

One must add to that also, and without exhausting the list, the setting in place of a regionalized technical infrastructure, the 3.5 billion in discounted loans attributed to the small and medium size businesses in 1979-80, and the creation of CIDISE which in two years distributed 436 participatory loans according to automatic criteria and an accelerated procedure. It seems to me that the balance sheet is impressive.

[Question] Does being able to define automatic criteria for obtaining discounted loans constitute a revolution?

[Answer] Yes, for the mechanism of assistance is as simple as the formulation of need. . . The small and medium-sized businesses which have a minimum of structure in the balance sheet, satisfactory rates of export and expansion, and which therefore are healthy but lack their own funds for further development, these companies

can call on CIDISE which then applies objective criteria. And it works! By the same token, I might remind you that, of the 28 dossiers held by CODIS (Committee for Strategic Industries and Developmental Guidelines) (which is often accused of being only for large companies) more than half concern businesses which are not part of large groups.

[Question] What remains to be done for the small and medium-sized companies?

[Answer] We must proceed further in the regionalization of the Ministry and go equally as far in the simplification of administrative detail. Additionally, we must direct savings toward the small and medium-sized businesses; we should be able to move forward insofar as small companies are often more remunerative than large ones.

[Question] CODIS has appeared to be one of the props of your policy. However, the method adopted to create and select the projects appears to be slow and inefficient. Do you think, in spite of all that, that you have fulfilled your mission?

[Answer] In regard to consumer electronics, our actions have been useful; the strategic work of evaluating market trends and technological breakthroughs has been done. We have been able to tally these breakthroughs. Unfortunately, no manufacturer has come forward. . . Is it CODIS which is inefficient or is it the French industrial structure which, from this viewpoint, poses a problem? It is not the administrative structure which is inefficient, for we have fulfilled our mission of stimulation.

[Question] And cybernetics?

[Answer] I don't feel that we are going too slowly. All of France, not only the Administration, has taken its time to appreciate the importance of automation and cybernetics. CODIS surely has played an important role in raising the consciousness of the public. We cannot disregard the results we have obtained. Commitments of gross sales has hit one billion francs and investments 250 million. The movement has been launched.

If you want to fully appreciate the all-encompassing, total action of CODIS, you must realize that the designated areas represent a market of 700 billion francs for 1985. It is therefore really the strategic industries which have been effected. Thus, the French bureaucracy can expect one-fourth of the world market.

[Question] What will be the areas of concern for CODIS in the near future?

[Answer] We are thinking of engineering, in the widest sense: we are also considering chemistry, which is also a candidate. We can therefore expect a new category very soon. Submarine operations will be one, for we have reached our objectives, which were to make people realize that our place in this area deserved to be confronted. The Maritime Appraisal Company has been put back in operation, AMREP, DORIS, ETPH, and Bouygues Offshore are functioning well. . .

[Question] . . . Although Francis Bouygues is annoyed at not having been able to take control of DORIS when it seemed to him that he had obtained your agreement in that regard.

[Answer] I had promised Francis Bouygues a benevolent neutrality in the rivalry which was placing him in opposition to other industrialists who wished to take over DORIS. I kept this promise since the French Petroleum Institute abstained from voting at the council meeting where it was decided: I could not intervene any more without breaking precisely that neutrality.

[Question] Let's finish with CODIS. Is consumer electronics still under its jurisdiction?

[Answer] Yes. This area is too important to be closed based on the facts that we have just mentioned. The next administration will have to devote itself again to this problem.

[Question] The slowdown in productivity suffered by the auto industry faced with Japan--does this not compromise the future of this key industry? Will you always be able to contain the importation of Japanese cars? Can protectionism be, in a general sense, a solution to this? Under what conditions?

[Answer] You seem to say it is we who are protectionist. My response is this: Japanese protectionism is unacceptable. At this moment, the penetration of French automobiles in the Japanese market is 1 percent.

That is not the problem. The government's position on this subject was expressed conjointly with the Federal Republic of Germany during the recent Franco-German summit, in the following terms: "The wished-for expansion of reciprocal exchanges assumes that Japan will further open its markets to European products and will diligently seek to reduce the excessive concentration of her exports on a small number of products. This expansion further assumes that the businesses of our two countries will increase their efforts in the Japanese market, thanks to the resolve of an increased presence and to a reinforcement of their international competitiveness." Any other policy is unacceptable.

[Question] Is the French automotive industry competitive?

[Answer] The automotive industry exports 50 percent of its total production, while 25 percent of the interior market is supplied by foreign manufacturers. There's the proof that we're competitive. Secondly, may I remind you that French cars are better than Japanese cars; we have nothing to learn in the realm of the creation of vehicles.

It is essentially a question of equalizing the price. We come again to the necessity of automating the tools of production. What we must do is very clear: automate the factories and create the corresponding machines in such a way that the loss of jobs in the automotive industry is compensated for by a corresponding creation of new jobs in the fabrication of these machines. Hence, the plan proposed for the technical area: doubling of automation and tripling of the production of automata by the end of 1982.

[Question] Do you see any activities where France is poor y situated but which must, at all costs, be protected?

[Answer] There are indeed some very essential and vital activities where we should not let ourselves be outdistanced. Electrical components is one significant example.

[Question] Is the machine-tool industry a part of these vital activities?

[Answer] That industry no longer exists in an isolated state. The very terminology itself is out of date. What is important is the combination electronics-mechanics. If this is not vital then it is, at the very least, very important. Electronic components are essential in the same way as certain areas of biotechnology. For security reasons, other industries are equally essential: raw materials, composite materials, etc.

[Question] If you are still Minister of Industry after the 11 May election, would you take into account the criticisms directed at you during the campaign (absence of overall planning, actions judged too timid, insufficient support of sectors in difficulty. . .)?

[Answer] I don't feel that I have been criticized during this campaign. Let's examine the three areas you have brought up. Those who claim that the government has no overall plans while, at the same time, anyone can see the action which has been taken in the area of electronuclonics, space exploration, data processing, telecommunications, biotechnology, aren't proving a lot. On the second point--and I am not modest on this--I claim that in the realm of industrial policy and the definition of concepts, France is, next to Japan, the most advanced. And finally, in the matter of the sectors in difficulty, there are two cases: when it is a question of putting them back on their feet, we are there; do you remember the steel and textile industries which we vigorously supported. If it is a matter of swallowing up taxpayer's money in backwards and poorly managed businesses, we leave that policy to others.

9803

CSO: 3100/700

CISL LABOR LEADER'S MAY DAY SPEECH IN ROME

Rome AGENZIA UNITARIA SINDACALE in Italian 6 May 81 pp 11-16

[Speech by Pierre Carniti on 1 May 1981 in Rome]

[Text] Ausi, 2 May--This May Day is a difficult one, certainly the most difficult in recent years. The reasons for this are not only the growing signs of uneasiness and discontent among workers due to worsening economic and social problems, threats to employment, the rise in prices and utility rates, the dramatic problem of the home (11,000 evictions--11,000 families the equivalent of a city like Viterbo) and the disruption of health services.

These objective evidences of uneasiness and alarm have increased, but subjective reasons also add to the disorientation of workers. This is because they feel they are the blameless targets of exaggerated polemics, of structural positions that threaten and in any case weaken the united power of the workers at a time when there is more need of it in order to combat a ruinous recessive policy.

The monetary and credit policies decided by the government are as ineffective as they are perverse and are designed to oppose the unity and strength of the workers against new claims by the bosses. It is not enough to be right in politics. Power is needed to affirm it, and for the workers this power was their unity. But what causes worry is not the different opinions on policies--these have existed, they exist and will always exist. No one can think of a united and democratic mass movement based on passive discipline, on obsessive unanimous actions, of a uniformed movement. This is not what tens of thousands of militants, cadres and leaders have dedicated their commitment, heart and reason to in a project capable of making decisions about their collective fate, contest absurd privilege, and to transform society according to the lines of solidarity and equality. The basis for the decisions, for the choices, cannot be anything but democratic participation, party discussion, confrontation, different opinions. It is also natural that when problems become more urgent, agreement more difficult, discussions more animated, polemics can arise that can also be useful if they help everyone see the terms of the situation more clearly--see the stakes. A movement that operates in the dark is not stronger, it is merely more subordinate. What is damaging and must be firmly fought is the dishonest polemics engaged in with an ulterior motive, intolerance, the attack on people's intentions, hanging back, the caricaturization of others' positions. In short [we need to] brake the

"nit-picking" that destroys the trade union and leaves the opposition unharmed (therefore strengthened). Precisely because the situation is complex and difficult, what is useful is not to silence debate but, starting from diversity of contributions and confrontation, we must know how to express an aware harmony, a tight coherence, a strong tension in order to achieve effective united synthesis adequate to the bitterness of the challenges.

What is needed is not the ritual and rhetorical reference to unity, not the appeal to feelings, but to reason. What is necessary is above all the language of truth.

Our starting point is the urgency of all-out struggle against inflation. A reactionary policy transfers resources from the poor to the rich, from the have-nots to the owners' class; it increases the desperation of the unemployed, makes the situation of pensioners unbearable. Inflation that gallops along at over 20 percent eats up wages. If it increases it will even destroy democracy. In order to win this contest we must give up a line of passive defense which is no longer valid. We must move beyond the limits of protest--that is as generous as it is inconclusive--in order to express an active line of struggle and change, a new capacity for workers' unity which would avoid defensive introversion, disorganization, deterioration, social splintering, the line of "everyone for himself" which leads to defeat--not of this or that category but of the entire trade union movement. We must fight the ruinous line of the monetary and credit squeeze implemented by the government which does not reduce inflation, destroys the economy, reduces employment.

Starting with the second half of 1980 there was an obvious decline in purchasing power; a decline in real wages. At the same time we noted a reduction and a leveling off of wages and an increase in inequalities. This is the policy of social levels, it is the corporative policy that is always the policy of the most powerful; not of who is right.

A joke is played on the pensioners by giving them an increase of 1,500 lire per month (50 lire per day) while compensation for doctors, magistrates, pilots is increased by 21 million lire: an increase of 15 million [as published]. It is asserted that the demand is not scandalous because German pilots are paid that amount, but German steelworkers also are paid twice what Italian steelworkers are paid. As real wages decline and inequalities increase, the line of recession produces serious consequences for employment: Employment in factories with more than 500 employees: In February it decreased by 1.8 percent; number of hours worked decreased by 9.3 percent. The critical situation in the steel, auto, chemistry, telecommunications industries continues.

In Rome, 1,800 jobs at the Voxson plant are threatened; 800 Itavia employees still do not know what their fate will be; the Maccarase problem remains open; the jobs of 10,000 workers in the telephone industry are tied to the solution of the crisis in that industry. In general, if forecasts of zero growth prove true more than 250,000 workers throughout Italy will lose their jobs.

We well know that wages are not the cause of inflation (that is a falsification that tends to confuse the fever with the illness) but we can defeat these

positions if we avoid the error of exchanging the instrument for the objective. The objective is defense, improvement in real wages, in purchasing power; not the means, the instruments we use to achieve these results. We must escape a losing, debilitating and purely defensive logic in order to take a positive opposition stand along the line that would unite all the workers; an initiative that would heal the structural and cyclical causes of inflation, that would make support of real wages compatible with a drastic reduction of the level of inflation [as published].

The main points of this line, which have been discussed by the trade union movement for some time, consist of: antirecessive measures and aid to basic industries (automobiles, chemistry, steel, telecommunications, transportation); reconstruction and rehabilitation of the earthquake zones; rehabilitation of the large urban centers of the south capable of giving employment to tens of thousands of unemployed; preventing disorganization and social splintering in the south from causing an explosion of warfare among the poor; preventing the rise, as happened recently in Naples, of "southern terrorism" which, with the lack of any feeling of humanity, plans to destroy the bases of democracy through violence and murder.

Democracy can be defended only by democracy, but a democracy that is incapable of offering hope, a future for the unemployed, for the women, to the pensioners and above all to youth, commits suicide in the long run.

Therefore it is necessary to change, and truly change, social and economic policy. Aid against recession must be accompanied by measures capable of cooling off inflation. We must achieve: (1) a ceiling on utility rates: It is true that there is an increasing deficit but an extensive deficit is less inflationary than the impact of increased rates on prices; (2) a freeze (for 1 year) on rent increases; (3) a freeze on price lists and prices of some staples (bread, milk, pasta, sugar); (4) a freeze on incomes over a gross amount of 30 million lire; (5) reduction of interest rates (and therefore also of the cost of the public debt); (6) introduction of an immediate and real campaign against tax evasion.

Data made public by the Finance Ministry recently confirm what we have denounced for some time: While the incomes of dependent workers [public employees] have increased by 20 percent (77 over 76) those of independent workers and professionals increased by only 2.3 percent. Considering inflation, we are faced by growing poverty: Thousands have not even filled out a tax return and some of these had a verified income of more than 500 million lire. Tax evasion is not an individual but a social matter. It is the cause of the national deficit and therefore of inflation. For this reason we demand urgent measures for a reorganization of the financial administration, to prevent that administration from being transformed into a counselor and accomplice of tax evaders (the oil scandals): Verification of receipts, and handcuffs for tax evaders. A couple of months ago the press reported that Francesco Vio, an ATAC [expansion unknown] employee, was sentenced to 16 months in prison for having stolen 150 lire from ATAC, after a trial that lasted 8 years (in various stages) and involved 16 judges. And then they talk of a crisis of justice! If anything, the doubt remains that if he had stolen a few billions even through tax evasion, he would have been considered a brilliant financier and perhaps named a knight of labor (like Caltagirone or Muselli).

To fight the causes of inflation, to remove its structural causes also means to fight the industrial policy of theft, the usurious administration of credit, the destruction of police forces, the collapse of agriculture, the paralysis of public administration.

In consideration of a rigorous anti-inflation policy on these bases--which for us must be on a priority and favorable basis after, and not before, the freeze on prices, utility rates and rents--there is explicit support of the entire trade union movement in order to achieve a growing wage policy with an agreed upon and programmed reduction in the rate of inflation and within this framework also of a predetermination of the sliding wage scale increases. This must be done with the most rigorous guarantees not only for the protection of real wages but also for the degree of coverage in the sliding wage scale. In other words: If, at an inflation rate of 20 percent, the sliding wage scale covers two-thirds of the wage today, when it drops to 15 percent, or even 10 percent inflation, it must still continue to guarantee two-thirds of the wage.

This presentation should be integrated with the rapid implementation of suggestions formulated at Montecatini regarding retirement and pensions, with the guarantee of negotiation on all levels, against a freeze on negotiations both for public and private employees, which would allow a return by the window of what we kicked out the door: reduction of real wages.

On these bases it is necessary to have a more timely opening of discussions among workers whose consensus is decisive regardless of the line the trade union proposes to adopt. What is necessary, in fact, is a firm judgment and a reliable decision that could knowledgeably deal with and surmount the large problems we must face.

The bitter reactions of Merloni, Mandelli, of Carli, of the building trades proprietors, the line of the government's economic policy, which is an alternative to our own, must warn us that no one makes a gift of anything, that the struggle will be bitter and that therefore it is now much more necessary to have strong cohesion, a strong commitment, strong unity, as in all phases of the passage of history. Even the experiences we are undergoing are full of potential if we know how to interpret them, but they are not free of danger.

Even democracy can move backward, as demonstrated by the continuing temptations to limit the right to strike. Even freedom can be lost; and our country lost it and recovered it with much pain and much blood. Freedom is always in danger. This is confirmed by the delirious and barbaric presence of terrorism, and also the lugubrious collection of signatures by the party for the death sentence and courts martial, which in full harmony with the armed party, desire to reduce civil and political custom to a state of barbarity. These dangers must be defeated if the workers and democratic forces have the courage and determination to challenge the privilege of the few; the inequalities that sanction unacceptable injustice, serious risks of disorganization.

We must therefore build an effective platform and upon it promote a decisive initiative. If we do not have the ability to impose a resolute change of course,

things are destined to worsen. The moderate and conservative forces in our country have in fact significant cultural and political reference points in all industrialized nations.

In Europe, unemployment has reached unprecedented levels. More than 10 million are unemployed in Europe and forecasts are even worse for the coming years if there is not a real change in the course of European governments' economic policies.

This is what is being talked about this May Day in workers' demonstrations in the main European cities, but only a stronger agreement upon objectives, a greater unity of action, a broader and more decisive will to fight by the entire European trade movement can weigh in the consideration of governments, community institutions, the European proprietary class. This need for coordinated international action by the trade union movement is still greater and more urgent if we look at the world situation. Tensions and conflicts increase; there is an increase rather than a reduction, after so many solemnly undertaken commitments, in the gap between the world's north and south, between developed and developing nations; too much of humanity lives in poverty while there is an immense waste of riches, such as the money spent on armaments.

One billion lire per minute is spent in the world every day in order to produce instruments of death. This situation cannot continue. A world marked by so many imbalances and so many injustices can never be a world of peace. As Willy Brandt said, a world with more armaments will not be more secure, but only poorer. The workers want peace, but that is based only on justice. This is why we are convinced that the priority objective now must be the construction of a new international economic and social order that would put an end to exploitation and to the dependence of the Third World, that would open a new perspective for the development of everyone on the basis of relations of cooperation among equals motivated by a profound awareness of a common destiny. Today more than ever, no nation must think it can save itself by itself. There are no happy islands in a sea of tempests. The Italian workers have a vital interest in a new policy of cooperation on the world level. We therefore ask that it assume its responsibilities and carry out a more active, independent and effective intervention in all international power centers. The world's peoples reject supervision and hegemonies; they want to take their destiny into their own hands.

The CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] UIL [Italian Labor Union] Federation opposes all the violations of fundamental rights of peoples to self-determination and independence. This is why we have condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and we ask that an end be put to it. This is why we renew here our support for the struggle of the democratic and revolutionary forces of El Salvador who fight against an exploiting oligarchy and those who, military or civilians, represent their class interests. As FDR [expansion unknown] President Ugo said, a negotiated political solution is possible in El Salvador. We will strongly condemn anyone who presumptuously should reject a peaceful solution of a conflict that has already caused enormous suffering to the workers and the people of El Salvador.

This is why we renew our support to the black workers of Africa in the south against the Apartheid racist regime; this is why we once more say that a stable peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without a just solution of the Palestine problem, without recognition of the right of the Palestinians to create their own state even in respect and for the security of all the nations of the region, and therefore, of Israel. In this May Day the united federation renews its fraternal and effective solidarity with all those anywhere in the world who fight to affirm the dignity of individuals, of their fundamental rights and among these, the right to organize trade unions. While we are here at San Giovanni, the Chilean workers in Santiago, Chile, defy police repression in order even there to have a May Day demonstration. With them there is a delegation of the CGIL/CISL/UIL Federation to show our commitment and our militant solidarity in their battle for a free and democratic Chile. But precisely in the heart of Europe, a great new fact has emerged in recent months: From the struggle of the Polish workers, Solidarity was born. We salute it with the proof that despite all difficulties, the fundamental aspirations of the workers can never be extinguished and among these, with explosive force, is that of being a protagonist of their own future.

This is a difficult May Day, but it is also a day of hope, of potential, of struggle. The challenges before us certainly are not easy, but neither are they impossible. It is up to us.

6034

CSO: 3104/264

MEDIOCREDITO TO AID SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES

Rome IL POPOLO in Italian 14 May 81 p 15

[Article by Roberto Ambrogi]

[Text] Rome--The head office of MEDIOCREDITO [Financial Credit Bank] is currently considering the formation of a holding company capable of channeling fresh money into small- and medium-sized industries and of thus contributing to their growth. The news, which has been "in the air" for some days now, was confirmed yesterday by Rodolfo Banfi, president of the institution, during his talk at the Documentation Center for Economics Journalists, in which he spoke of the role of specialized credit institutions and of relief credit facilities.

The creation of this holding company, which already has the formal consent of MEDIOCREDITO's board of directors, responds to the need to aid smaller-sized enterprises--essentially sound ones--at the venture capital level, so as to reduce their levels of banking indebtedness (today--Banfi explains--enterprises are having to resort to ordinary bank credits even as regards the financing of investments and not only for the conduct of their operations). The idea had its origin in the fact that MEDIOCREDITO's regional branches currently intervene to a substantial extent among small and medium firms, which are experiencing a very low percentage of insolvencies. Why not then, Banfi asked himself, use MEDIOCREDITO's regional offices as a "selective screen" to sift out a certain number of sound firms with good growth potentials? These firms would be asked to increase their capitalization: The shares would be bought by the holding company which would then issue shares in its own name on the Stock Exchange, representative of a certain number of firms, preferably located in a given region or province, pointing toward potential investors in that region or province for subscriptions.

The idea advanced by Banfi is, however, still in its embryonic stage: Actually, he did not specify the nature of the "shares" the holding company would issue (he stated a preference for "debenture stocks"). He also emphasized the existence of certain "drawbacks" to such an operation in the charters of the MEDIOCREDITO regional offices. But he made it clear that the "participational holding company" would absolutely not be a relief organization. On the contrary, it should be capable of laying down a "company policy," setting for itself the objective of abandoning a firm when the latter reaches a point of "takeoff," that is, when it is in a position to step upward dimensionally.

Banfi said further that the operation would also have a "cultural" effect, in that it would serve to persuade businessmen to use other than their traditional systems (bank indebtedness), and would, through new stock issues, gradually enlarge the Stock Exchange, which is currently the most "emaciated" among those of the industrialized countries.

In his wide-ranging talk, Banfi dwelt at length--as we have said--on the role of special credit institutions and on the relief-credit system, underscoring the main causes of the current "state of stricture" of the institutions in question, especially the bonded-debt ones. These causes are: first and foremost, the diversity of "structures" existent in the financial credit system; secondly, the diversity of means of supply; thirdly, the medium- and long-term loan competition offered by the ordinary credit system and by the public sector; and lastly, the high rate of inflation and the relief-credit structure itself.

Regarding the relief-credit system, Banfi pointed out that the commonly leveled criticisms of the relief credits are of two types, bearing as they do on their futility (in that a company, in deciding its investments, does so independently of interest rates), and on their ill effects (because the incentive they represent can induce investments contrary "to sound industrial practices").

The fact remains, however, that at least insofar as concerns exports the need for relief credits is indispensable if one wants to remain on a competitive footing with the other countries, many of which provide outright a kind of "direct intervention" (a reserve held by central agencies to knock down minimum interest rates) which enables their enterprises to benefit from even lower than "Consensus" rates. Thus, according to Banfi, the export relief credit is "fundamental," and the Ossola law "arrived barely in time" to rescue our industry.

To remove the causes that hinder the operativeness of our special credit institutions--Banfi then said--a "reorganization" of the banking system as regards division of labor is nevertheless necessary. "Strategic" planning must also be brought into being (and the medium-term plan is moving in this direction). And lastly, we must turn to forms of relief that are based not on contributions to interest accounts but rather on discounts and advances.

9399

CSO: 3104/276

OZAL OBJECTS TO SEE'S BEING EXPANDED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 18 May 81 p 1

[Text] Ankara (ANKARA AGENCY) -- Efforts to reorganize the State Economic Enterprises, or SEE, to make them more productive are being held up by disagreements within the government. According to the information obtained, the disagreement over reorganization of the SEE has to do with whether they should be "larger" or "smaller."

The Industry and Technology Ministry's proposal to the "SEE Committee," chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Zeyyat Baykara, calls for conversion of the SEE into large "sector holding companies." A "Supreme Oversight Council" would be formed under the office of the prime minister to appoint the holding company administrators and oversee activities.

The "Supreme Oversight Council" would be attached to the office of the prime minister and would be composed of [university] teaching members, qualified administrators and labor and management representatives. The council would appoint the holding company administrators but would not interfere in the appointment of general directors by the administrators. Activities of the holding company administrators would be subject to continuous oversight, with the Supreme Oversight Council free to conduct inspections whenever desired.

Sector Holdings

No unity of view could be reached within the government, however, on the concept of "sector holding companies." Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, one of the influential members of the "SEE Committee," contends that the existing SEE problems stem from their being too big and that it would not be realistic to form even larger structures in order to solve the problems. He objected to an energy holding company which would take in all of the agencies such as Turkish Petroleum, Turkish Electric Power Enterprise and State Hydraulic Affairs.

According to Turgut Ozal's heavily favored view, a pilot program in SEE reorganization should start in Turkish Petroleum. Turkish Petroleum, which is responsible for oil exploration, could be brought together with the distributing Petroleum Office and its attached refineries to form a "petroleum holding company," but any larger a combination would create new problems.

INFLATION SLATED FOR 40 PERCENT

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 19 May 81 p 1

[Text] Ozer Ciller, director general of the Istanbul Bank, said, "The inflation rate will remain around 40 percent at the end of December."

Ozer Ciller expressed his views on what developments may occur in the economy in the second half of 1981, stressing that the interest rate on time deposits should be reduced from 50 percent to the 40 percent-45 percent level if the rate of inflation drops to around 40 percent in 1981, and said the following:

"Of course, however, while we free interest in order to encourage savings on one hand, if we then quickly lower deposit interest on the other, this is certain to have a negative effect on the saver.

"Something like this may be proposed in order to minimize and, in some cases, eliminate this negative effect: If withholding taxes are reduced from 25 percent to 15 percent, then the saver could get over 37.5 percent, some 38 percent, net income at the 45 percent interest rate, for example. In short, from the standpoint of the saver, reducing deposit interest would not have a negative effect. There would be a great deal of benefit in such an effort."

Feyyaz Berker

Feyyaz Berker, former president of TUSAID (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), stressed that costs would increase toward the end of 1981 in industries which have cut output and capacity use in order to liquidate stocks and that the companies with higher costs would want to raise prices. He defended the following views in this regard:

"The industrial sector is at present transferring the profits it should be making in 1981 to the banks as interest on the credit they have obtained from the banks. This is going to happen throughout the entire industrial sector in general. It is my guess that the recently released industrial sector profits for 1980 will be a great deal lower in 1981. And this is a trend which self-financing and investment strength can widely reduce toward 1982."

Stating that exportation was the only thing that would make it possible to use more capacity and liquidate stocks in the second half of 1981, that would ensure industry the use of credit at lower interest and therefore make it possible to lighten the financing burden, Berker concluded his remarks as follows:

"Exportation will largely increase Turkey's foreign exchange input and prestige abroad and will immediately change foreign banks' concern over Turkey for the good. It will also attract foreign capital. All of these problems are extremely inter-related. It is impossible to separate one from the others. But as significant results have been obtained with a little effort, I believe even more today that positive results that would surprise everyone will be achieved with serious and continuous effort."

Yilmaz Karakoyunlu

Yilmaz Karakoyunlu, general coordinator for Banker Kastelli Stocks, Bonds and Trade Incorporated, said that he was anxious and pessimistic about 1981 and expressed the following views: "I do not think the rate of inflation will go below 50 percent. Thus even if we were to keep interest on 12-month deposits at 50 percent, real interest would be zero with inflation at 50 percent. When real interest is zero, the flight from the consumption which is a present worry will be exactly reversed, making the wheels of the economy reverse direction, and the flight from saving will begin."

"The rate of inflation can be expected to speed up unless monetary expansion can be controlled in a balanced way. Especially with the increased money supply in September as required by the agricultural support policy, it may be stepped up a little more."

8349

CSO: 4907/278

DISK, MISK ASSETS RISE SHARPLY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 21 May 81 p 8

[Text] Ankara, Special -- The total monetary assets of the 25 DISK and MISK unions in Ankara which were 36 million liras when the unions were turned over to caretakers have reportedly risen to 263 million liras, an increase of 227 million liras in the past 5 months.

A statement by the Ankara Martial Law Command says, "There is a noticeable difference between yesterday's and today's deposits of these unions, which are known to have had no spending from the strike fund for years."

Following is IV Corps and Ankara Martial Law Command's statement on the present financial status of the Ankara unions of the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions (DISK) and the Confederation of Nationalist Labor Unions (MISK) whose activities were halted following the 12 September operation:

"1. Stated in the following paragraphs is the May 1981 financial status of the unions in Ankara attached to DISK and MISK whose activities were halted on 15 September 1981 and which have been administered by caretakers for approximately 5 months.

"2. While the total deposits of these 25 unions, which had been in existence for approximately 10 years, were 36 million liras on the date on which court-appointed caretakers took them over in accordance with Law No 2316, total deposits have risen to 263 million liras within the intervening 5 months past. In this connection, DISK unions Municipal Service Workers Union rose from 6 million liras to 100 million liras, Soil, Water and Agricultural Workers Union from 500,000 liras to 13 million liras and Hotel, Restaurant and Amusement Places Employees Union of Turkey from 800,000 liras to 41.6 million liras; MISK unions Turkish textile workers union from 30,000 liras to 6.8 million liras and Turkish steel workers union from 200,000 liras to 5.9 million liras. There is a noticeable difference in yesterday's and today's deposits of these unions which are known to have had no strike fund expenditure for years.

"3. Moreover, 350 million liras outstanding from past periods in various municipalities which the iron workers' union inexplicably had not transferred to its account have begun to be collected.

"4. Documents relevant to the activities of the caretakers, who work under the supervision and oversight of the Command, and to the past irresponsible spending of the union administrators are available to press and news agency members upon request."

BRIEFS

TURKEY-IRAN TRANSPORT AGREEMENT--According to the "transportation draft agreement" signed yesterday in Ankara between Turkey and Iran, Turkey is expected to earn approximately \$400 million from the transport of 2.5 million tons of freight to Iran by rail and highway. According to a draft agreement signed by Iranian Deputy Transport Minister Qa'em-Maqami and the deputy undersecretary to the Transport Ministry, Orhan Buldac, Iran and Turkey will apply a reciprocal 20 percent reduction to the transport of import goods by rail. Furthermore, a commission, meeting in June, is to reduce Iran's higher transport fees. According to the agreement, 60 currently in-operative Iranian locomotives are to be repaired in Turkey. In the draft agreement, which provides that 1.5 (as published) million tons of freight will be transported across Turkey to Iran, it was agreed that all measures will be taken to facilitate the transport to Iran by Turkish transporters of 270 thousand tons of wheat which will be arriving in Samsun in a few days. In the draft agreement it was decided that upon the creation of a joint transport company between Turkey and Iran, the Turkish-Iranian telex system will be expanded from the current 6 lines to 10 lines. [Text] [Diyarbakir YENI YURT GAZETESI in Turkish 8 May 81 p 8]

COFFEE IMPORTS--Ankara (Special)--The monopolies directorate general has begun to draft a contract for the importation of 1000 tons of coffee. It was stated that the contract specifies Rio-5 type coffee. After the contract is prepared a request for tenders will be posted and the importation will be carried out according to the bids received. The imported coffee will be given to touristic enterprises. It is noted that Turkey's yearly coffee requirement is for 6000 tons. [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 5 Jun 81 p 12]

INCREASED WORKERS' REMITTANCES--Ankara (AA)--The chairman of the Central Bank, Osman Siklar, stated that workers' foreign exchange remittances would reach \$2.6 billion by the end of the year. Central Bank Chairman Osman Siklar said: "the increase in workers' foreign exchange remittances is great proof of their faith in the state." Siklar noted that in the first 5 months of 1981, workers' foreign exchange remittances reached \$739.9 million and that this figure was \$586.2 million last year. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Jun 81 p 5]

NEW 'COMPROMISE PACT' BY PARTIES IS TENUOUS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 21 May 81 p 1

[Editorial by el]

[Text] The coalition parties on Christiansborg are in agreement that they disagree on how long they will agree on the compromise they now have entered into on economic policy.

That was evident from the press conference that was held yesterday by the government, the Social Democratic Party, the Radical Left, the Democratic Center and the Christian People's Party. If you are confused, wait until the next economic compromise comes along.

It will come next fall, already, but presumably not until after the municipal election on 17 November. None of the parties can commit itself to final responsibility for economic policy in 1982 in earnest before then, but when the election is over the following paragraph of the compromise will take effect: "When, during the fall of 1981, a more reliable evaluation exists with regard to the prospects for the international markets and the domestic economy, including prices, wages, balances of payment and unemployment, the parties will carry out a concerted evaluation of the need for budget corrections for 1982 or other measures concerned with economic policy."

Converted into ordinary Danish, that means that the compromise on economic policy has every possible chance of being revoked after the end of this year before it ever begins to operate.

Thus, the Democratic Center and the Christian People's Party reserve the right to support a possible assault on the government next fall on the demand for the prohibition of exclusive agreements on the labor market, for if the government should be overthrown after the municipal election because of a lack of agreement on economic policy for next year, after all, the claim that it should no longer be possible to force people to belong to a certain trade union in order to be employed on a certain job would constitute a splendid theme with which those parties--together with the other conservatives--could appeal to the country. That is obvious--and above all the economic "nof", [expansion unknown] not much of which is comprehended by anybody, in any case.

On the other hand, if the parties are in agreement on the "maf", they probably will find one excuse of another for avoiding the assault on exclusive agreements. As, for instance, the Democratic Center now has announced that it does not want to be involved in overthrowing the government before the summer holidays.

Yes, but what do exclusive agreements have to do with economic policy? If you are confused, it is because you do not understand politics.

On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party also does not want to completely renounce its right to fight for the concerns which are so typical of it: profit-sharing and redistribution of interest deductions; for that party can never know when an election is suddenly going to come. Thus, for the time being, the period of the compromise for the Social Democratic Party only extends to the end of 1982, and a sharing of profits and redistribution of interest deductions in 1983 are possibilities which cannot be excluded. For the Democratic Center and the Christian People's Party, however, the compromise extends all the way to the fall of 1983, when the campaigning for the Folketing election will take place, in any event. And if that is the case, there can be no question of putting profit-sharing and redistribution of interest deductions into effect for that long.

"If you are confused, wait until next May," the prime minister said at the press conference yesterday. At that time, it will be apparent how long the compromise which has been entered into is actually going to last.

If it hasn't already been overthrown by December, as was mentioned earlier.

From one point of view, a compromise covering half a year has now been entered into. From another, it is for a year, and from still another it is for a year and a half. Regarded as entertainment, it compares very favorably with a popular Saturday-afternoon TV program!

As an actual phenomenon, it is quite frightening. The compromise does not contain a word about what overall effect it will probably have on employment, but it might ordinarily be rather crucial for a Social Democratic government which is faced with unemployment of a scope such as has not existed since World War II.

Nine months ago the government and the Budget Department of its Finance Ministry estimated that, as a result of the economic compromise in May of 1980, unemployment among individuals without even part-time jobs would amount to 150,000 this year. Four months later, when the budget for 1981 was to be adopted, unemployment was estimated at 175,000. The other day, it was estimated at 192,000, instead, but at the same time the economic experts came up with an estimate of 237,000.

If the Budget Department's figure of "only" 192,000 for the whole year hold good, unemployment will have to fall to about 100,000 in the fall. According to all indications, then, the experts are right, and if that is true the highly-qualified economists in the Budget Department mistakenly estimated 87,000 unemployed only 9 months ago. That causes the state to make an extra outlay of more than 6 billion kroner in unemployment relief.

That is an important reason why the deficit in the state's budget was calculated at 16.3 billion kroner for this year 9 months ago, was raised to 21.1 billion kroner six months ago and now is estimated to run to 27.4 billion kroner--that is, a mistake of over 10 billion kroner in estimating the deficit, and that mistake also resulted from underestimation of the drop in the population's income.

Therefore it is easy to understand why nobody dares say anything at all about the economy in 1982, although a compromise on the economy has been formally entered into on Christiansborg.

But if you are confused, go looking for a job as an economist in the government's Budget Department.

9266

CSO: 3106/121

SOVIET WRITER TO VISIT, SEES SIBERIANS IN PAN-ESKIMO DRIVE

Godthab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 7 May 81 p 4

[Text] The Soviet writer Jurij Rytkeu, whose mother was Eskimo, is presently visiting Greenland to contact various Inuit organisations.

Contact between the very small Eskimo population of approximately 1500 in the northeastermost part of Siberia and the Inuit in Alaska, Canada and Greenland has been extremely limited up to now. However, that is changing today. Soviet writer Jurij Rytkeu, whose mother was Eskimo, is a guest of the Greenland government in early May. He is traveling as a writer in connection with a Unesco project, but he will also use the visit to contact Greenlanders and ICC representatives.

The Unesco project aims to publish a series of books entitled "Polar People Tell Their Story,"

"Tons of books have been written about the polar regions and polar people by writers from vastly different areas. Within the framework of this project, we shall now attempt to publish our own books," said Rytkeu.

Contact Must Be Expanded

In the opinion of Jurij Rytkeu, contact between the Eskimo population in the Soviet Union and the Inuit in Alaska, Canada and Greenland should be developed.

"That is also the reason I am visiting Greenland. I am familiar with the ICC organization and I believe it is possible for Soviet Eskimos to participate in this cooperation. It is my impression that Soviet authorities want such cooperation and I am personally very much open to contacts while I am in Greenland."

"Have you discussed the possibility with Soviet authorities?"

"No, but since I was given a visa and permission to travel to Greenland, I can only assume that authorities officially encouraged me to make such contacts. I also hope that delegations from the Inuit in Greenland and other areas can visit Siberia."

Jurij Rytkeu says there has been much industrial development in Siberia in the last few years, including the area in which the Eskimos live.

"Yet, to a great extent, it has been possible to maintain traditional trades like herding reindeer and catching sea turtles. We have noted growing interest and respect for our traditional culture in the last few years, particularly among the young people. Great efforts are being made today to preserve and develop the Eskimo language, in spite of the fact that the Eskimos are among the very smallest ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union. Approximately 800 of a population of 1,500 speak Eskimoan."

The next time we will feature an in-depth interview with Jurij Rytkeu.

8952

CSO: 3106/123

FIRST AIR ROUTE TO NORTH AMERICA TO HAVE POLITICAL IMPORT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 14 May 81 p 9

[Article by Philip Lauritzen]

[Text] Except for a single red lamp in the corner, the rest of the huge room was dark. Only the steel chairs by the long tables glistened somewhat in the light from the bar on the other side of the room. The bar in the Canadian Legion was in the shape of a large horseshoe with slide. Two white bartenders with a completely glazed look were busy pouring drinks. One was wearing a sweater with the Nuuk/Godthab city emblem on it. When we pointed to his chest and told him that is where we are from, he lighted up momentarily.

"I got it from a fellow on the other side. You have liquor rationing, right?"

We had just arrived in Frobisher Bay, Nuuk's neighbor across the Davis Strait. It was midnight and we had spent half an hour trying to get into the closed club, whose history goes back to World War I' when Frobisher was the springboard for American troop transports to Europe.

The entire Greenland World Press was thirsty. We had arrived in the largest town in the east Canadian Arctic (2,500 inhabitants), after test-flying the new Greenland Air route SK-921 from Nuuk to Frobisher Bay.

This was my second visit to Frobisher. The first was in 1977 when I landed there on my way to Greenland. While we sat there in the huge drinking hall with rigid discipline, I remembered how frustrating it was then. Although you cannot see Greenland across the strait, it is very close. On the map, just a small step eastward. But at that time it was impossible to take that step. I asked everybody and his brother at the airport and finally found one plane that was headed due east. But it was a charter plane and there was no way I could go along. The airlines were watching one another; SAS and Air Canada were arguing about landing permits and had strict orders from the authorities that no one, but no one was to take "hitch-hikers." The only way to get to Greenland was via Montreal, Copenhagen or Kangerlussuaq/Southern Stromfjord, a 15-hour flight costing several thousand kroner.

Some 4 years later the trip takes 2 hours and 15 minutes and costs 1,250 kroner one way. The route was officially opened 6 May with a test flight carrying various

dignitaries from Greenland and Canada, followed by a dinner for all the passengers and a range of regular staff guests at official dinners in Nuuk.

With the opening of the new Greenland Air route, the first abroad so far, the historical unbilical cord between Greenland and Denmark was cut. For the first time ever, Greenland became "connected with" its closest neighbor, North America. In many ways, that was something of a revolution or, it could develop into one.

The Canadian Legion is not a destination point. But the situation so far has been that the only route to Greenland and out of Greenland has been via Denmark. This colonial isolation outlived the colonial period by almost three decades. For several years now, Greenland has had a political desire for contact with the West, not least on account of its kinsmen. There have also been negotiations for several years. But SAS has stubbornly protected its monopoly on flights to Greenland. Until a few years ago, it was absolutely the most profitable route in the world for SAS. Existing conditions began to change only recently. Anker Jorgensen has been discussing landing permits with the Canadian government. Inuit cooperation has become a reality, home rule government has become a fact and SAS has seen its prime. Anybody traveling with SAS today notices the decline in service and enthusiasm. SAS has also completely dropped its flights to Canada. Daily departures from Kastrup to Montreal have been terminated; one can no longer fly directly from Denmark to Canada--except on Greenland Air.

Traffic is politics. Right up until today, Arctic connections have been north/south. The wishes and interests of a majority society have controlled a minority society's connections.

But traffic is also technology. The first link in Greenland's traffic revolution was the helicopter. Today it is Greenland Air's Canadian Dash 7, a four-engine propellor plane, one of Greenland's beautiful birds servicing Greenland's east coast, Nuuk and Narsarsuaq. In a few years it will also service Ilulissat/Jakobshavn.

Dash 7 has already been a revolution inside Greenland. Up until a couple of years ago, the usual mode of travel was by boat from Kangerlussuaq to Nuuk in order to be sure of making the connection. That took 24 hours. Helicopters were not dependable. Bad weather and rather complicated technology often created--and still creates--long delays. The 24-hour boat trip was sure transportation, in spite of a fresh breeze or even worse. The alternative could be several days' wait in Kangerlussuaq, which served as a waiting room between the two cultures.

Today, you can fly straight through. The last time I came from Denmark, we departed from Kastrup at 11, arrived in Kangerlussuaq at 11:30, departed Kangerlussuaq at 13:00 and arrived in Nuuk at 13:50.

Some 2 hours and 50 minutes after we left Denmark we were in the capitol of Greenland, excluding the 4-hour time difference. This has been a revolution, not least for government officials and politicians. For the newcomer, it just adds to the cultural shock.

Greenland is no longer the final stop. Greenland Air route SK-921 takes you from Frobisher and this route connects directly with Nordair's Boeing 737, which takes you to Montreal in 3 hours. From there, North America lies wide open. Beginning today, people in Nuuk can vacation just as cheaply in Copenhagen as in New York and Greenland Air is planning to offer packaged vacations to Florida, among other places.

We will soon be able to observe the traffic revolution. There are two weekly departures and much interest, according to Greenland Air. On the negative side, there is the fear of young Greenlanders plundering New York instead of Copenhagen and the thought of unrestrained importation of tourists (in the United States Greenland is Santa Claus country) and American goods. On the positive side, it will mean more contact, opening up after hundreds of years of isolation, new trade possibilities in a period of anti-EEC sentiments and new experiences. In any case, the fact is that Nuuk has become the European city within the shortest distance and time of North America.

There are already signs of the new times in Greenland. Throughout the winter, one of the local supermarkets, Frikob, with annual sales of more than 30 million kroner, had dew-fresh vegetables, fruit and flowers as well as fresh meat from the United States and Canada. Grocer Willy Jensen imported 5 to 6 tons of goods every week by charter plane directly from Canada and today he is selling these goods to several Greenland towns. Even in Angmassalik, on the east coast of Greenland, fishermen can buy fresh California apples and vegetables. On the return trip, the charter plane has flown fish from Greenland to Canada.

Partners Frikob and Godthab Fiskeindustri have documented that year-round air service can be economical. "The Ice Curtain Through the Davis Strait," as Eskimo expert Karl Isaksen once called Greenland's isolation against the West, has been broken. Vegetables did that. But it will undoubtedly not continue to be just vegetables.

8952

CSO: 3106/123

EDITORIAL ON PCI'S 'DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE' PROPOSAL

Rome L'UMANITA in Italian 28 Apr 81 pp 1-2

[Editorial by Giuseppe Averardi: "Socialists Face Supreme Test Again"]

[Text] Following is the full text of Editorial No 87, April 1981, from the magazine RAGIONAMENTI edited by Comrade [Giuseppe] Averardi.

1. A considerable impression was made by the political proposal advanced by the PCI leadership. There is something new in it and it is natural that--aside from hostile reactions--there should be doubts and questions. What led the communist party to offer itself as the focus and recruiting site of large forces that would represent a real alternative to a DC [Christian Democratic Party] which no longer appears able to insure political and moral guidance for which there is extreme, vital, need?

And why does this initiative come at this time? I believe it is clear that the new element in the proposal also is the fact that it is not an invention of a new parliamentary formula--some sort of alchemy.

In substance, the PCI proposes to deal with the problem of the now necessary change of leadership groups and classes.

It is precisely for this reason that this proposal is addressed not only to the political forces but to the entire country in order to mobilize it; to organize a mass effort, a current of opinion. But is this proposal realistic? Is it credible? Where are those who debate it?

Is there going to be a frontal clash with the entire DC and the mass Catholic world? Doesn't the party face the risk of leaps forward and sectarian regurgitation? And what has happened to the historical compromise?

2. The interpretation offered by the communists themselves is that there has been no definitive abandonment of the "historical compromise"; we have not arrived at an alternative to the left; we have not reached a radical change of strategy. And in this regard Enrico Berlinguer is explicit: "It is not a strategy change. It is a proposal for a change of government. It is evident

evident that our general position remains centered on cooperation of the large popular forces, of the communist, socialist and Catholic masses."

Therefore, it is not to be a lay government nor an alternative to the left, but a "democratic alternative," that is to say "a proposal for a government even with those who do not belong to the left but are loyal to the republican constitution."

More specifically, an executive that would not be presided over by a Christian Democrat (because that party is not capable of managing the country's government), which obviously would include the socialist, but--be careful--which neither would exclude "the part of Christian democracy that would be capable of expressing advanced positions and [having] honest persons."

Again in regard to the historical compromise, Berlinguer was epigraphic: "I smile at all these gravediggers of the historical compromise. Why should it have failed? What has failed is the caricature that they made of it by presenting it as a pure government formula; worse! as a power agreement between ourselves and the DC. We have said a hundred times that it was not this, but the search for a meeting of the minds between different components of Italian history, of national society, also, therefore, between different classes, in order to make possible a profound democratic change (a second 1945, it has been said) in respect for pluralism and the republican constitution. What do our critics want? One of two things! Either they want to prevent that change--well understanding that some form of historical compromise is the only possible lever for it--even at the cost of a bloody clash; or they hope that the PCI will give up working for a socialist society based on pluralistic democracy, both returning to the idea of a class struggle and of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and espousing the social democratic concept. They will be disappointed. Our strategy remains valid in its basic essentials."

To us it seems that the Visentini proposal is to be found above all in this new PCI strategy and that the Italian bourgeoisie will be the supporting and typical element of that strategy and that, after the socialist congress, the clash will be clearer and more precise.

3. We have asked ourselves why this initiative comes just now. The answer is in the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] Congress: Berlinguer's PCI is dealing with the changes in the PSI in the same way that it dealt with the process of socialist unification.

Luigi Longo--who at that time was PCI secretary general--proposed the unification between socialists and communists and the change of name of his own party in exchange for abandoning unification between the PSI and PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party].

Amendola went further than that proposal. Then there was the change in direction and the frontal attack jointly with that of the DC.

Berlinguer's PCI tried in every way to oust Craxi from the socialist secretaryship. The result is certainly known to everyone. Let us therefore move on to the second phase.

According to an often-repeated intuition expressed by Giorgio Amendola before he died, time does not work for the PCI either on the domestic or the international plane.

If socialist unification had succeeded and the "reformists" had taken the lead in unification in 1966 everything would have been different for the PCI, for us and more generally for Italian society.

But, as we know, history is not made up of ifs and we return to this fundamental problem of the more recent history of Italian socialism only to find an analogy with what is happening in Italy today.

It is not by chance that, now as then, the PCI change in direction is accompanied by the growing nervousness of the Christian Democrats. Now as then (it seems to be a historical recurrence even though we do not believe in historical currents and recurrence) the PCI and the DC move from the same concerns and toward the same objectives: The growth of a strong democratic and reformist socialist area, which would be an alternative to the power of the two major systems and the search for ways that would destroy the reformist plan.

The DC feels the squeeze of isolation. The atmosphere created in the past few hours at Palazzo Sturzo is that of extreme crisis: It recalls the disorientation felt after the socialist unification. But then there was always the safety net of the ideas and prestige of Aldo Moro. Now everything is more difficult. The victory of the "preamble" at the congress, described only a few months ago as the turning point of "governability," produced nothing but debris.

What is really new is represented by the Visentini operation. And it can be understood why. In any case we shall soon be able to test these hypotheses.

4. Our friend Giorgio Galli wrote in issue No 76 of the magazine BIBLIOTECA DELLA LIBERTA an article entitled "Reflections of a Lonely Man." In the article we find some new and original elements accompanied by the usual obsessive pessimism concerning the incompatibility of the Italian political system with a shift toward reform. We must emphasize what is new and original in reference to our analysis.

Galli writes: "I have hypothesized that the center-left could be a reform coalition but experience has shown the limits of the experiment (today it is said that it was a period of broadening civil liberties without which the students of 1968 would have been faced by Scelba's armored vehicles: It seems that this is a somewhat hasty analysis).

In that debate long ago in BIBLIOTECA DELLA LIBERTA (with Basso, Bobbio and Matteucci) I expressed the hypothesis that there might also be possible changes in electoral legislation for the regions and the large local administrations in order to produce an easier alternative that was maturing (the changes were rejected, but the alternative matured into what the communists described as the "earthquake of 15 June"). Today it can be seen that good administration in itself does not represent an alternative while the crisis of the central system

is aggravated. I believed that the evolution of the PCI during the 1970's was such as to legitimize its participation in a coalition governing the nation. Today it can be seen that among the democratic and authoritarian elements present in its tradition, the PCI (its leaders) used cooperation with the DC in the recent legislature almost exclusively stressing the latter (from a return to party control over the trade unions to the assessment of our social problems, above all as problems of public order, to democratic centralism).

Perfect!

That means that the PCI, if Galli permits, is now playing a game of chance and bets everything on earlier-than-scheduled elections and on the defeat of the Socialist Party because it is convinced it will repeat the work of disintegration of socialist unification in a conspiracy with the DC, that is, it aims to destroy the work just begun by the PSI reformist group and by the Pietro Longo group, in the PSDI.

In short, the plan of the so-called "democratic alternative" is an obvious indicator of the serious strategic difficulty the Communist Party faces and of the apprehensions it has for the future.

In fact, even if Gerardo Chiaromonte counsels further reflection on the steps taken by his party, it is not clear on what conditions and in what way the communists could achieve their governmental intentions within the present political framework following the responses made by other political forces.

In reality, there is nothing left to the communists but the card of earlier general elections: Not, it should be pointed out, in order to create a government of alternative, but to regain consensus concerning the PSI and magnanimously once more to propose the "historical compromise" to a Christian democracy reinforced at the expense of intermediate lay forces.

Unless there is a new PCI change in line following the Palermo Congress—that is to say becoming aware of the irreversibility of the process of PSI independence—the PCI will return to the policies of 1978.

Chiaromonte already expresses a long and well-reasoned opinion on Craxi's theses on economic-trade union participation. Chiaromonte's view, in line with the political position taken by Secretary Berlinguer, in view of the tone and language used—which after all are typically his—was considered "conciliatory and open."

In fact, Chiaromonte recognizes that "the possibilities of convergence between our positions and those of the PSI regarding economic policy seem to be broad" and that the political attitude of the PSI regarding programming "decisively" qualifies Craxi's party as belonging to the left. Therefore it is possible to find ideas for an understanding.

Chiaromonte's article concludes with a question that seems in substance to justify the thesis of those who interpret it as a major opening toward the PSI.

In fact, it is insistently asked why the socialists "are silent regarding the communist proposal of the democratic alternative."

In all this, Visentini plays the role of the busybody.

5. Italian socialism is the history of a long traumatic affair, which burst forth first into Fascism and then into the largest communist party in the democratic West and in the quasiparalysis of the representative parliamentary system. Galli is right.

The main "constant" was the incapacity of the PSI leaders to translate rank and file agitation into political opportunity, from the actions of 1900 at Genoa and from the first general strike of 1904 to the "Red Week" of 1914; from the revolt against the attempt to assassinate Togliatti in 1948 to that of Genoa and other cities against the Tambroni government (1960), to the student and workers movements of 1968 and the rebellion of Bologna in March 1977. These were actions and strikes, often spasmodic, which nevertheless took place under circumstances that were often very different, with their own nature and objectives--from negotiations to actions that were basically contestatory--and which constitute an often contradictory evolution of the workers movement and not a simple "repetitiveness."

The agitations, victories and defeats at times also had political results: From socialist support of the Giolitti government, which obtained universal suffrage, up to the dialogue with the Catholics and to the center-left with the nationalization of the electrical industry and other more or less successful reforms.

But a well-planned experience of political reform is still to be tried.

The PSI and the PSDI are once more preparing for the great test, at the beginning of the 1980's, which perhaps will be the most difficult years for Italian democracy. To our pygmies who show they fear a reformist and democratic PSI, we can do nothing but counteract with a firm and responsible political action. To those historical republicans who from Macchiavelli's lessons seem to have learned only the one that is easiest and taken for granted--that the end justifies the means--we answer with the lesson of the more authentic liberal, antifascist and democratic-liberal tradition of the Mazzinis and the Einaudis.

6034

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PCI ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SCANDALS

Rome IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 5 May 81 pp 16-21

[Article by Amedeo Lanucara: "Here Is Good Government, Communist Style"]

[Text] Arrogance in power, ineptitude, corruption: the image of the PCI has become tarnished, as we have verified by investigating the city governments in Bologna, Ferrara, Comacchio, and Grosseto. Profit splitting, phony corporations, violations of city planning regulations, abusive constructions—is this "new way of governing" what Berlinguer wants to impose on Italy?

The PCI's hands are stained--this is the finding of an IL SETTIMANALE investigation into four of the most noted sanctuaries of communist municipal rule: Bologna, Ferrara, Comacchio, and Grosseto. The total picture is a desolate one of scandals, injustice, arrogance in power, inefficiency. Stripped of its international alliances, the PCI hardly seems capable to assuming its much vaunted alternate leadership, based on good government and honest administration. The facts will speak for themselves.

Bologna

Readers of IL SETTIMANALE already know the story of the Talon Park scandal, motive of one of our publication's major battles. The key factor in this affair is a question arising from the revelations made to the magistracy by Carlo Bordoni, financier Michele Sindona's right arm: did Sindona ever contribute to the PCI? If so, on what basis? In what form? How true is Bordoni's declaration that the name of the SICO corporation, set up in Switzerland in the early 1970s, stands for "Sindona-Communists?"

One fact is beyond question. In Bologna, the division of Talon Park into building lots was the work of "Dedalo Spa," a sham corporation established by a "friend" of Sindona, which bought the park in 1973 for approximately 1 billion lire, an enormous sum to pay for terrain on which building construction was not permitted. But Dedalo soon resold the land for 4 billion lire to Sindona's construction company, after the city's zoning law was illegally modified to permit building

there. The 3 billion lire in profit promptly vanished into Switzerland, with the profiteers neatly evading payment of taxes.

This fact, which is proven, explains why speculators devastated Bologna's monument park, conceived in the 18th century by the greatest landscape architect of all time, Andrea La Notre, who put his signature on Versailles, the Tuilleries, and the Champs Elysees.

In this real life mystery story, the question now is: who exactly is responsible for the crime? The killer is definitely not Mayor Renato Zangheri, who apparently has been secretly opposed to the sale of the extensive, green park, which borders on the contiguous territory of Casalecchio di Reno. Indeed, it was the "front men" of this community who were indicated as perpetrators of the crime, in company with certain professionals of Bologna and Milan. These men, however, did not make off with the 3 billion, except possibly for pin money; they were hired killers, not the mastermind who raked in the loot.

After the mystery persisted for years, the latest word has it that Mayor Zangheri has decided to take his distance from the clique of communist officials in Rome and Emilia who exerted pressure to ensure the success of the operation. In this connection, certain embarrassing actions in the past on the part of Bologna's first citizen assume a logical significance--for example, his persistent silence throughout the opposition's repeated interrogations in the City Council. Zangheri has refused to answer their questions, despite his official obligation to do so. Another indication: the withdrawal of two legal charges against IL SETTIMANALE after we brought suit against Zangheri in 1977 for neglecting his political responsibilities.

His cancellation of the lawsuit just before the SICO bomb exploded could mean that the plaintiff had no wish, especially if he was not involved, to find himself implicated in this most unsavory scandal ever to infest the PCI. A situation of this kind, with a high PCI official breaking with his own party, even to the extent of canceling two "obligatory" lawsuits, has never before occurred in Italy.

We discussed this matter with Federico Bendinelli, 38, lawyer, chief of the Christian Democratic group in the Palazzo D'Accursio, who confirmed our interpretation of the matter. "I have good reason," he said, "to believe that the mayor of Bologna always opposed his party's scheme to split up the park into building lots. But party discipline compelled him to cover the misdeed by refusing to answer our questions and by bringing suit against IL SETTIMANALE. I can understand how angry he must have felt at being accused of participating in an operation he disapproved of, but which, for political reasons, he could do nothing to prevent."

We asked whether Zangheri could be incriminated for the devastation of the park. "I should say instead," Bendinelli replied, "that the Zangheri case is an example of the PCI bureaucracy's tendency to clamp chains on its officials, even the most qualified and progressive-minded, and to oblige them to run dangerous risks of paying the price for shady adventures undertaken by the bureaucracy itself. I am sure that the exposure of the Talon scandal would bring these underhanded practices to the surface if the magistracy is willing to throw full light on them."

Does Bendinelli think that the entrapped mayor might come out into the open and tell all to avenge himself for all the gaff the party has forced him to swallow? Bendinelli: "I don't think you can expect such heroism of a communist leader. Rather bear in mind the Carabinieri's famous motto: 'Make it your practice to obey and say nothing,' although not always 'say nothing and die.' But one thing strikes me as certain--that in the past few years, the PCI has used Zangheri as a rod to deflect the electrifying force of its scandals and to explain away its electoral losses at the polls. In the bargain, it has exploded the myth of the Bologna administration's incorruptibility."

One last question: what motive could have induced Sindona to make contributions to the PCI? Bendinelli's obvious reply: Sindona paid off the various parties to prevent them from opposing an increase in capitalization of Finambro--from 1 billion to 160 billions--on which the survival of his financial empire depended. From the PCI he was satisfied with its benevolent neutrality. And he got it.

Talon Park is not the only instance of PCI wrongdoing in Bologna; the city administration is currently under fire for another serious violation of the law. This new scandal, publicly aired on 13 March by the daily GIORNALE NUOVO (which blazoned its report in the local edition with a five-column headline), concerns the appropriation of public land on the Via Stalingrado, where the Co.Ta.Bo. (communist taxi cooperative) erected two sizeable barracks for its offices, a stone building, a car washing station, and an antenna 65 feet high, all without permits. The city government is simply looking the other way.

On 24 February, the MSI city councilman Filippo Borselli brought up the matter when he asked for an integral copy of the legal papers concerning the incriminated constructions from Mayor Zangheri, the building commissioner, and the San Donato quarter, which administers the Via Stalingrado. A perusal of the documents confirmed the illegality of the cooperative's structures. The issue was debated in the city council, after which a lawyer and private citizen, Alfredo Regnicoli, sent a statement to the public prosecutor of Bologna, pointing out the laxity of the city council which, Regnicoli avers, has had a thousand opportunities over the years to take note of the abuse. Moreover, the cooperative has planted its offices on land for which it pays the absurdly low rental of 157,000 lire a year.

IL SETTIMANALE has talked with Borselli about this matter.

"Beyond all doubt," he told us, "the primary administrative responsibility is that of the communist assessor of private building, Elio Bragaglia, and the agencies affiliated with him: the departments of hygiene, habitability, conservation of the surroundings, the coordinated technical sections, and the department of streets. Also ENEL for providing electricity, SIP for installing telephones, AMIU for removing trash, and ANGA for supplying water and gas. According to the Bucalossi law of 1977, such services may not be extended to abusive constructions. It is not possible that the entire municipal government or the public utility agencies were unaware of these violations because a modification of the 1978 zoning laws expressly included the land turned over to the Co.Ta.Bo--which had already built its illegal structures--in an area designated for industrial purposes, in the hope of painlessly getting the union off the hook for its abuses, however irremediable by law. So much for the administration's culpability, not to mention the penal consequences entailed."

But what about political responsibility? "There is no doubt," Borselli went on, "that such an act of embezzlement must implicate Renato Zangheri politically. He is the head of a city government that has certainly been fully aware of the facts I have exposed. And I will say something more. Until now at least, it seems to me that both the mayor and the city council are still covering up the scandal for two reasons: they have never drawn up the lease, and they have never opened any enquiry into the complicity of the various utility agencies concerned. Should this refusal to act be prolonged, we must ask ourselves if we are not confronting an omission of official duties."

Bendinelli goes further: "The effects of these scandals have been shattering, to use a euphemism. And they have swept away the complacent illusion that the PCI's hands are clean."

Question: What about the Zangheri myth? Reply: "I do not say that he is mixed up in these violations. All the same, the mayor is accountable for the actions of his administration."

Ferrara.

The Renaissance oratorio of San Crispino, which lends considerable style to Ferrara's central Piazza Cattedrale, is not liked by the communists. For the past 15 years, they have been trying to disfigure it, either by building an ugly cement addition above it or converting it into a trade center.

The art guide books tell us that the palazzo is very ancient in origin. Once the seat of the cobblers' guild, it was subjected to various alterations over the centuries. Today we can distinguish three different structures: the great open gallery, dating back to the second half of the 15th century, with arcades fronting on the piazza and the two side streets, the Via Contrari and Via Mazzini; the hall of the oratorio, up one flight, dedicated to Sts. Crispino and Crispiniano, patron saints of the cobblers, with 17th century frescoes on the walls and ceiling; and, facing the square, the neoclassical facade added in 1861 by the city's chief engineer at the time.

Since the PCI's aversion to the oratory cannot be attributed to an antipathy toward cobblers, we must assume that the communists' motives lie elsewhere--in a passion for buying and selling which, in 1967, netted them a profit of almost 200 million lire, worth about 1 billion today.

The facts. A sham corporation calling itself SIT (an identical twin to Dedalo SpA, guilty of the Talon Park scandal in Bologna) bought the palazzo from the city for a trifling 66.4 million lire.

Why "trifling?" Giorgio Boari, lawyer and member of the DC opposition in the city council, explained, "While the building's value should have increased over the years in view of rising property values, in this case the city's assessment of it steadily decreased, from 101.3 million lire in 1965 (its first appraisal) to 66.4 million in 1968. This contradiction has never been convincingly clarified, either by the chief engineer or by Bruno Pancaldi, public works assessor, who has repeatedly denied any responsibility, most emphatically for the last appraisal in May 1968. His signature, he insists, was only meant as a mere formality."

Several months after the palazzo was acquired, the capital stock of this phantom SIT organization, which owned nothing apart from the oratorio, was sold to a Ferrarese businessman for 214 million lire, or more than three times what the city had been paid for it only a few weeks before. Another singular fact: a city councilman known to be in close contact with the PCI turned up in union headquarters. What became of the 150 million lire realized from the sale of the oratorio? Who pocketed it? No one, of course, has any idea.

Seeking an explanation (was it a swindle at the public expense?), the judicial authorities instituted penal proceedings, which ended inconclusively, but not without some suspicions confirmed. Their verdict, in fact, states, "Dense shadows remain, not only concealing the administration's participation in the whole operation but also the extent to which that participation is punishable by law. The very long lapses of time have buried the facts under a heavy, impenetrable cover. However, the following data can be taken as proven:

"a) The transfer of the ex-oratorio ended in a clamorous real estate speculation, conceived and concluded by a lawyer, Mario Mariotti, for his exclusive benefit. This he accomplished by means of a spurious corporation called SIT, constituted by persons who had nothing to do with the affair, indeed some of whom were totally unaware of it (genuine 'wooden heads'). If none of the administrators or public officials had been in league with Mariotti, then we can only conclude that they were all either ingenuous or, at the very least, negligent in their duties.

"b) The price paid by SIT to the city council was clearly far below the value of the property, as shown not only by the resale (first by agreement, subsequently by stipulation) of the building at three times the original price but also by the appraised value fixed by the surveyor Piffanelli in behalf of the Banca Popolare di Bologna e Ferrara, which established the value at 200 million lire.

"c) The entire procedure of the transfer was carried out in great haste and with incredible superficiality. Among other defaults, those involved preferred not to put the property up for public auction, and the deed of sale was stipulated without the required authorization of the ministry (...)

"d) We note the city government's progressive and, ultimately, total withdrawal of the demand that the open gallery be destined for public use even though in the course of time important, and foreseen, discoveries of exceptional artistic worth have come to light."

Probably never before has such a harsh verdict been pronounced against a city council, even though the investigating judges had been unable to obtain the proofs needed to commit the guilty to prison. The Christian Democrats, therefore, want to investigate the case further.

The violations committed in Ferrara, however, do not stop with San Crispino. The district attorney is also probing another serious transgression in the construction of three apartment houses, with 16 living units, on the Via Caldirolo, in an area reserved for "heavy industry" by the city's zoning law.

As if that were not enough, in areas classified as "rural and agricultural green" along the road to Francolino, a number of expensive villas have been erected with illegal building permits. Moreover, a whole luxury residential quarter has sprung up along a nearby street, called "of the Statues," an agricultural sector designated as "landscape green" by the zoning law.

And again: city planning set aside an area around the Via Pomposa as the site for low-cost housing; for this purpose, the land was entrusted to a communist cooperative. But instead of housing for workers, the cooperative has built a row of elegant villas, with the infraction attributed to five members of the cooperative's administrative council.

"For all these unbelievable violations," Boari says, "the district attorney has turned over all pertinent papers to the magistracy. The investigating judge interrogated me on the San Crispino and the Via Caldiroli cases, and tax officials queried me on the other scandals before some 30 warrants of arrest were issued to the persons implicated. I hope these matters will be fully clarified. And soon."

Comacchio.

Once there were the valleys of Comacchio and the quiet Ferrarese beaches so dear to the ancient Pelasgians. There was the medieval Abbey of Pomposa, the mecca of innamorati from all parts of the world.

These marvels have been suffocated under miles and miles of cement as a result of the most outrageous land speculation since the war. Ruthless aggression has ruined the tourist industry, employment, and the general welfare of the entire zone. The few hotels and restaurants to be found charge staggering prices, while the modest pensions, so characteristic of the Romagna coast, have all but disappeared.

In their place are numerous real estate agencies, veritable centers of banditry. An example of current prices: the least expensive apartment in a condominium (more exactly a "residence") offered us cost 30 million in cash, with no discount--this for a single room with kitchenette, bath, and a lilliputian terrace, the whole measuring some 20 square meters, excluding the walls, or 1.5 million a square meter. According to the zoning law, these "residences" should have been low-cost housing for workers.

For 30 years, Leonida Patrignani, 72, DC city councillor, has fought to save the area from such havoc. Says he: "The Comacchio zoning laws, which include the seven Ferrarese beaches, had one objective: to transform some of the land into gold mines, with the inevitable instances of corruption, which the courts have been unable to prove. The fact remains that these zones have been qualified as suitable building sites, although the necessary approval has never been granted, whereas other zones have been disqualified as building sites when, in fact, they had been approved for urbanization. The responsibility for such duplicity can only be laid at the feet of the PCI."

Could he cite an example? "An extensive stretch along the sea front," he answered, "was declared off limits for building purposes. But no sooner was

it acquired by a communist construction firm for the price of a bag of pipe tobacco than suddenly it was declared open to builders--this through the usual technique of the variant. Now hundreds of apartments are under construction with funds totaling tens of billions. Naturally we have denounced this maneuver. But the whole matter went up in smoke. Reporters on the Catholic publication IL CONFRONTO who exposed nonexistent building permits and excesses of every sort have been charged with defamation through the medium of the press, but acquitted on appeal. So nothing has changed. In the city council, the facts have been quashed; to questions put by the opposition, the communists never take the trouble to reply."

Romano Guzzinati, lawyer, 43, PLI provincial secretary for Ferrara and member of the party's central committee (Zanone district), says: "The scandal of Comacchio is the town planning itself, put through by the communists. It has fostered speculation beyond all decency. Pomposa and the Lido delle Nazioni are without streets and sewage systems. A community project for public works requires at least 60 billion lire, which the city government cannot find."

The magistracy has issued eight warrants of arrest to as many communist and socialist officials for abuse of office or complicity in crime. The accusation: a construction company has been promised a wholly unmerited "favor" in return for laying a sewage system. In itself this is no grievous irregularity, but it indicates how public affairs are being managed by Comacchio's communist regime.

Grosseto.

Despite urgent appeals by organizations like Italia Nostra, the WWF, and Pro Natura, all of which have ended up nowhere, the famous Tombolo pine wood, typical of the Maremma sea coast, is being progressively cut down.

Paolo Pisani, 35, president of the Grosseto branch of Pro Natura, has this to say: "Anyone can see with his own eyes that the pine trees along the coast have been subjected to wholesale destruction over the past 20 years. The invasion of cement and camping sites (the latter presumably to benefit the people but run only to rake in huge profits) has gradually disfigured this natural habitat. Is it possible at least to limit the damage? Certainly. In March 1976, to preserve the coastal pine strip, Pro Natura proposed a plan on the basis of an exploration by infrared photography sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce and executed by the Institute of Hydrology and Medical Climatology of the University of Milan. Organizations which should have cooperated in realizing the project included the Chamber of Commerce, the municipal government, the province of Grosseto, nature groups, and all other local associations in any way interested in the ecology of the area. Together they would have made it possible to preserve the environmental blessings and safeguard its agrarian, woodland, and forestry patrimony as well as its historical and artistic treasures. But the proposal was rejected twice, with the catastrophic results which everyone deplores today."

A little history. Toward the end of the 1960s, a general variant to Grosseto's zoning laws which sanctioned the inviolability of the pine wood was approved. The few installations that existed at Principina a Mare and Marina di Grosseto

were already deemed excessive. What was foreseen at the maximum was the completion of constructions under way (Principina a Mare), and the remodeling of houses already existing (Marina di Grosseto).

In 1971 the variant had hardly been approved by decree of the Ministry of Public Works when ample revisions, which questioned the inviolability of the coastal strip, were taken under study. A variant to the variant was therefore adopted by the city council in 1974 and approved in a 1976 decree by the Region of Tuscany. The objective was an enormous increase of new apartments, hotels, and camping sites, and thousands upon thousands of square meters paved with asphalt, a rapacious speculation that demolished a magnificent pine wood extending for miles and miles along the shore and inland to a depth of not less than 1,000 meters.

This speculation took on overwhelming proportions. In Principina a Mare, the La Pineta real estate agency offered us a miniapartment measuring 40 square meters--sitting room, a kitchen set in a corner, bedroom, bath, and a miniterrace--for 70 million lire, 62 million in cash and a mortgage for 8 million lire at 16 percent interest. For another slightly larger apartment of 68 square meters we were asked something like 100 million ("It's really a bargain"). A nearly completed honeycomb of cement, indifferently refinished, 76 square meters in size, consisting of a sitting room, two minibaths and two minibedrooms, was priced at 150 million, 130 million in cash, with a 20 million lire mortgage at 16.5 percent interest.

We asked why a square meter should cost 2 million lire, as much as one would pay for an apartment on the Via Veneto in Rome or the Piazza del Duomo in Milan. The reply: "Here land costs a patrimony. Just recently, 1,100 square meters of land not approved for building purposes sold for 200 million."

While whole areas of the pine wood are being leveled, Grosseto's frontist administration has dotted the remaining woods with a dozen maxi camping sites.

The World Fund for Nature has protested against a maxi camping site, the "Marinella," which belongs to a mysterious Swiss-Maremma corporation. The WFP has presented a complaint to the Grosseto magistracy, the city administration, and the forestry authorities, demanding verification that owners are adhering to urbanistic controls and restraining environmental regulations in their constructions either completed or nearing completion. Among other grave doubts, it is feared that the camp structures built or being built of reinforced concrete are "intended to prepare the area for total urbanization." The construction work on "Marinella" has been temporarily suspended (but for how long?).

Nevertheless, work on other maxi camping sites is proceeding uninterrupted, including one directly controlled by PCI recreational associations, also on residential hotels, which will bring the speculators vast financial returns.

The courts have begun investigating "residences" costing 2 million lire per square meter when permits were issued for workers' housing.

Is this the communists' "new way of governing?"

9653

CSO: 3104

PCI'S NAPOLITANO ON EUROCOMMUNISM, EUROSOCIALISM

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 8 May 81 pp 3-4

[Article by Giorgio Napolitano: "Terms of the Debate between Eurocommunism and European Socialism"]

[Text] Any reference to the problems of the European left is strikingly absent on a rereading of Craxi's report. The crisis of social democratic doctrine and governmental experience is today being discussed not only by the communists but by the parties of the Socialist Internationale. The need to find new roads imposes a confrontation on immediate political matters as well as on aspects of the reform project. Where the choice of Euro-communism was made, and what value it has.

On rereading Craxi's report to the recent PSI [Italian Socialist Party] Congress, one is struck by an absence whose possible meaning was not immediately noted. I refer to the absence of any reference to the problems of the European left. Yet, Craxi for a year has given great emphasis to the present and historical ties of the PSI with the West European socialist movement and more specifically with the major social democracies, from the German to the Scandinavian (but not forgetting British Labourites). For a long time they have been the protagonists of considerable government experience. Evidently, it was believed that this reference could represent a point of strength and even a factor of renewal, to some extent, of the PSI "identity." Why was this care not played, in substance, at the Palermo Congress?

It could be believed that the PSI secretary and the party's majority may have wanted to focus attention clearly on the socialist role in Italy which was to ensure "governability" of the nation.

It also could be believed that they may have wanted to lay claim to that role--of guarantee and direction--on the basis of an exclusive reference to the facts of the Italian political situation without reference to the strength, the example and the prestige of other European socialist and social democratic parties. But it is a fact that the result was a restriction, to characterize it in fairly narrow terms, of the platform on which the PSI is presenting itself along with its new historical, political and cultural position.

Certainly, it could be argued that ties--or the rejoining--of the PSI with the European social democratic tradition and reality might even before the Palermo Congress have constituted an accomplished fact concerning which it would not be indispensable to insist. But the question in fact is much more complex. It is true that before and after the congress many did not begrudge the PSI recognition and praise--in more or less general, rhetorical and unctuous ways--for its arrival, without waste and residues, to the shores of "Western socialism." But what, in many cases, must be the meaning attributed to such recognition? There is no doubt that political leaders (and commentators), both moderates and rightists, had intended to emphasize--and they believed they could emphasize--a double change compared with the specific tradition of the Italian Socialist Party: that is, the overcoming of any reserve or critical differentiation regarding the positions and experiences of European social democracies, and the overcoming of any distinction or independent characterization within the western alliance, within NATO, and regarding hegemonic powers, the United States. Now what I am interested in pointing out is not so much the major or minor basis of the statements relative to a change in the judgment and behavior of the PSI on those two points. Particularly in regard to the former, the assessment of the social democratic experiences, there certainly has been a shift compared with the formulations of the "Project" submitted to the Turin Congress in 1978. Rather, I want to point to the noncasual nature of the omission, in preparations for the Palermo Congress, of any reference to the problems and present orientations of the European socialist movement.

The omission did not seem to us to be casual in the sense that it rather reflected an embarrassment, a difficulty, regarding a framework of problems and positions that have become too much the subject of conflict and contradiction to lend themselves to optimistic simplifications and stylized representations (of the type that still can be detected in the majority proposals for the Palermo Congress in a short section at the beginning of Chapter 10).

Many things are being discussed today in the main parties of the Socialist Internationale to the satisfaction of those in Italy who have, with ulterior motives, projected the image of a European social democracy that is firmly united in its traditional certainties. They are those who once more acted with the intention of denouncing the "ambiguities" of the PCI, the inadequacy of its effort to shift in a "Western" direction. The communists did not invent the crisis of the "welfare state" as a political and socialist construct, as an instrument of regulation and balance of relationships among classes or, if preferred, of "democratic compromise"--capable of neither revolutionary nor reactionary solutions of the struggle between capital and salaried work, beginning with the years of the "great depression;" They did not invent the crisis of what can be described as the "doctrine" and the "motivating force" of the governmental experience of the most important social democratic and labor parties in Europe. These subjects have been discussed for some time with increasing intensity by scholars and socialist militants in all countries, as was most recently demonstrated by a stimulating series of publications in the April issue of the PSI magazine MONDOPERAIO.

Discussion is in terms of concrete facts such as the renunciation--to which "countries once considered paradigmatic of the welfare state" were forced--of

full employment, "one of the basic aims of the welfare state." The discussion is in terms of reference both to the deterioration of the objective bases of that policy and that experience and to open rejection (even in elections) of the distortions that that experience finally produced. And as a result of the crisis in "ideas" and "practices" of the welfare state, the search for new ways, for new concepts of the economic development of the state (of the state's role and system) has become a necessity for the socialist and social democratic parties.

Naturally, this necessity is heeded to varying degrees, and those parties so far have given different reactions and replies. Giorgio Ruffolo, in a short but meaty article published some months ago in AVANTI!, spoke crudely of an impasse --because of the economic crisis--in European socialism which often was divided between a "right" that was unable to go beyond a "defensive policy," and a "left" that centered on positions of "demonstrative radicalism." In any case, no one can deny that a new dialectic has been opened in the European socialist movement and that current difficulties heavily damage the attempt to make of it a peaceful model from which currently valid solutions could be drawn--even for our own country--and against which the PCI instead still hesitates to conform because of its inherent "ambiguity."

But considerable indications of dialectics and difficulties can be seen in the socialist and social democratic parties even in terms of the role--and the playing of that role--of the nations of Western Europe within the Atlantic Alliance and in relation to the direction of United States foreign policy, particularly those that have so far emerged from the Reagan administration.

It can be said without the slightest exaggeration that there is a growing, solid and vigorous tendency among socialist and social democratic parties toward a more or less open differentiation from those American forces that push for--following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan--a harsh military confrontation with the USSR, an intensification of the arms race, a clash with the movements of liberation and progress. They are trying to involve the European allies in those choices. There also is a tendency among socialists toward greater independence and renewed commitment to negotiation (even in response to the aggressive acts of the USSR and with the aim of getting Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan), toward detente, nuclear balance and disarmament and a new international economic order.

All this has created the conditions for a more open and fruitful dialogue and for well-defined encounters between "Eurocommunist" parties and the forces of European socialism. Attention should be directed at the now regular relations established in the European Parliament, to initiatives such as those of some months ago in Madrid. It is a matter of determining whether the locales and opportunities for encounter can be extended; to find the forms for these encounters in a common commitment to study of the problems that are certainly common to the two historical "wings" of the Western European workers' movement. And it is a matter of determining how to make this set of problems one of the subjects of exchange of views here in Italy between the forces of the left, and primarily between the PCI and the PSI (this need was seen and posed, in view of the Palermo Congress, by the socialist left). We cannot, and as far as we are concerned, certainly we do

not want to evade the closest, immediate and burning issues of Italian politics, of "governability" and--specifically--of the Forlani government. But no thought can be given to program verification and encounters between the two parties, and much less to hypotheses of a democratic alternative, without supplying the opportunity for a commitment which is intertwined with the current debate in the European left. From the Palermo Congress emerged many contributions to a "thaw" as has been said; to a more serious and constructive development of the discussions and relationships between the PCI and the PSI. But in order that this possibility may not be lost, it is necessary to intensify the actual contacts concerning respective positions and to give them more precise and richer substance.

Returning to the discussion of Europe, I should like to say that many events confirm the depth of intuition and the choice of "Eurocommunism." Among these are primarily the new attitudes and positions that have developed, as I have rapidly recalled, in the European socialist movement, and the real processes, of crisis in old policies, from which they emerged. It appears these are not seriously taken into account by those who speak--like Alberto Ronchey in a recent article--of the "decadence of Eurocommunism." At this time many stress a diminished version of Eurocommunism as a collection of parties, and then count up the defections supposed to have taken place and the votes that were supposedly lost (and it is said that the PCI, after having grown "from 18.9 percent in 1946 to 34.4 percent in 1976, lost 4 percent in the 1979 political elections." As though in reality we had not gained 7 points from 1972 to 1976 and particularly thanks to the choice of Eurocommunism, as though it was as a result of that choice that we lost 4 points in 1979). And instead Eurocommunism has been and remains primarily a strategy, a grand ideological and political option, a line of investigation, validated by troubles that developed in the important socialist and social democratic parties. The basic problem is that of the seriousness and quality of the contributions that can come from either of the two basic components of the European left, and it is that of the synthesis that can be found among these different contributions.

The expression "third road" may not be liked (after all, it is not only we communists who do not use it), but can there be a denial of the need--also from the point of view of the socialist movement--for investigation of new roads, of new responses concerning the phenomena and risks of such serious economic-social crises and the crisis of democracy, and the counteroffensives of the right, such as those that trouble Western Europe? And does this investigation have something to do with socialism, or does the work done on needs and concrete objectives of change mean, for Giuliano Amato, to abandon oneself to a "dream-like love of projects?" And I speak of necessity, which a government of the left cannot escape. I call the attention of Norberto Bobbio to this. He, instead, counsels the left to undertake only here in Italy "the beginning of a light mopping up." (Certainly this is important and perhaps we communists would be better able to guarantee it than others--but that is not sufficient).

It is not sufficient to base oneself on reformism--understood as the choice of the gradualistic method and the democratic terrain--and to make of it a watershed in order to deal with the problems the workers' movement and the left, in Italy and in Europe, are called upon today to take on. We Italian communists for a

long time, according to the teaching of Togliatti, recognized and adopted in our strategy the need for gradualism, and in the most consistent way we have absorbed the value of democracy. And we have known how to deal positively, even if not noncritically, with the tradition and heredity of reformism. However, it is a question of seeing what a reform policy, a democratic struggle of change must and can be now. We believe that the PCI and the Eurocommunist forces can make a special and decisive contribution in that direction. At the same time, the formulation, in the name of reformism--as Gaetano Arfe has warned--of a "doctrine of antidoctrine, a hybrid heap of commonplaces, variably pragmatic, arrogantly affirmed, bureaucratically administered," would be useless and without benefit.

A party such as the PCI can make a decisive contribution since our "universe of traditional thought" was never made up only of certainties--as Ronchey seems to believe--entrusted to the development of the USSR and other socialist nations (and still less today is it made up of such certainties). But an original elaboration always has been fostered on themes of democracy, of "structural reforms," of socialism, in relation to an original political and mass experience, and gradually a profoundly critical analysis of the Soviet "model" was begun.

Recent events in socialist nations have in various ways confirmed the scope of the considerations that resulted in the choice of Eurocommunism, and also the breadth of its repercussions outside of Western Europe. This is the message contained among other things in the troubles and the renewal process that have been begun in Poland--even though some commentators instead use it as an excuse to somewhat ridiculously criticize a party such as ours for having been less "open-minded" than the Polish party, almost as though we were still anchored to the "model" of a Leninist party, or to "party centrism."

And finally, we say clearly that the bitter results of the presidential election of 26 April for the French Communist Party also constitute a fact that cannot fail to stimulate reflection and to reinforce the conviction concerning the need--for the communist parties and for all of the left--for a consistent development of the Eurocommunist choice in all its aspects and first of all in the sense of a clear and tenacious commitment, estranged from any sectorism or ideological formalism, in the search for unity with socialist forces. The communists must carry this commitment forward, strengthened by the great traditions and experiences of which we are historically the bearers and by a reasoned confidence in their ability to carry out an essential role.

6034

CSO: 3104/267

SOVIETS PROTEST NORWEGIAN HELICOPTER ON SVALBARD

Oslo KLASSEKAMPEN in Norwegian 15 May 81 p 2

[Article by Alf Skjeseth: "New Soviet Saber-Rattling on Svalbard"]

[Text] The Soviets have protested against a routine visit to Svalbard by a Norwegian rescue helicopter while the Russians themselves have a permanent helicopter base on the island.

"This is not a legal reaction by the Soviets under international law, but a political act of wagging an admonitory forefinger. Their reaction follows a pattern which has taken shape in recent years," Svalbard expert Willy Ostreng told KLASSEKAMPEN.

At first glance, the present episode may seem slightly comic. A Sea King rescue helicopter from the Banak airfield made a short visit in Longyearbyen in the company of the Coast Guard ship Senja, which was making its trip to Svalbard in April. That caused the Soviet consul in Barentsburg to send a note of protest to District Governor Jan Grondahl, claiming that the helicopter's visit was a breach of the Svalbard treaty.

"As far as the wording of the Svalbard treaty is concerned, that is an absurd reaction," says Willy Ostreng, who is the manager of the Fridtjof Nansen-Stiftelse on Polhogda.

A Political Warning

"But that is a traditional Soviet gambit," Ostreng says. "It undoubtedly is connected with Svalbard's geographical location. Svalbard is so close to the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea that it is of great strategic interest for the Soviets. They do not miss any opportunities there to remind the Norwegian authorities--often in sharp words--that they follow everything that has anything to do with Svalbard particularly closely. They do not intend to put up with any hints of Norwegian military activities on Svalbard, whether they involve helicopters or naval vessels. It doesn't make much difference how innocent such visits are where the Soviets' desire to make their point is concerned."

The Treaty

"But what does the Svalbard Treaty actually say about such things?" he was asked.

"The section in question is to be found in Article 9, where it is said that Norway must undertake "not to establish a naval base, or permit such a base to be established, in the areas mentioned in Article 1, or to construct any fortifications in the said areas which could ever be used for military purposes."

The Norwegian interpretation of the treaty follows its wording. It prohibits the establishment of naval bases or the construction of fortifications, and there never has been any problem with complying with it. But individual visits by helicopters or naval vessels can by no means be covered by the treaty.

On the other hand, the Soviets have a very, very special interpretation of the treaty. They want to place much greater restrictions on Norwegian activities than on their own. If one were to take seriously the criteria the Soviets are applying when they send protests to Norway, their own quay installations, roads and mines would also have to be in conflict with the treaty. With such an interpretation, it would be impossible to carry on economic activities on Svalbard, and the entire Svalbard treaty is based on the assumption that such activities will be carried on, for it is obvious that the civilian infrastructure, with roads, quays, etc., could possibly be used for military purposes under certain conditions.

The Cape Heer Base

"What about the Soviet military base on Cape Heer?" he was asked.

"The Soviets are throwing stones while living in a glass house when they protest against a single Norwegian helicopter's visit when they have a permanent base themselves," Willy Ostreng says. "But that does not necessarily mean that the Cape Heer base is in conflict with the Svalbard Treaty. It is not in conflict with the treaty if the Soviets can give an honest civilian justification for having helicopters there and no military use of the Soviet helicopters can be proved. On the other hand, it is a fact that the base was established without an application being made for the usual permission, and that resulted in a good deal of debate in Norway a few years ago."

District Governor Jan Grondahl rejected the Soviet protest. Among other things, he said in his reply that the Norwegian Sea King rescue helicopters do not serve any defensive purposes. "Among other things, the purpose of their sporadic, routine trips to Svalbard is to make the crews more familiar with conditions on Svalbard, so that they will be prepared to execute rescue operations there when they are needed," the district governor said.

9266

(SO: 3108/144

POLITICAL

NORWAY

BRIEFS

SVALBARD RESEARCH STATION PROPOSED--The Department for the Protection of the Environment is preparing a report to the Storting on research and the management of resources in the polar region. In that connection, the desirability of establishing a manned central station in Longyearbyen to assist the research workers on Svalbard will be investigated, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs and Education, Einar Forde, stated in the Storting on Wednesday. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 May 81 p 4] 9266

CSO: 3108/144

TAMAMES COMMENTS ON RESIGNATION FROM PCE

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 11 May 81 p 6

[Interview with Ramon Tamames, deputy mayor of Madrid, by Jose Luis Gutierrez in Madrid; date not given]

[Text] Ramon Tamames, the intellectual, university professor, [parliamentary] deputy, and deputy mayor of Madrid, who has just left the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], is a fashionable name today. His private telephone is ringing constantly and its din did not abate even during the very serious terrorist attacks which occurred last week. A genuine flood of newsmen rushed on the deputy from the PCE to confirm the report of his resignation from the party. DIARIO 16 managed to talk to Ramon Tamames in an authentically exclusive interview. The following are his comments.

[Question] When did you reach the decision to leave the party?

[Answer] Any decision of this type involves a certain amount of gestation and I so stated in my letter of resignation to all the PCE Central Committee members.

And I must say that this has been a really long period of gestation. It began with an attitude of expectation starting with the presentation of the problems which I made in December 1980--and which in my opinion afflicted the party--as well as their possible solutions. Subsequently, there occurred the serious conflicts of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], the events of 23 February 1981 in the Congress of Deputies, and all of this prompted me to keep silent and to hold the matter in abeyance for a few months.

I raised the issue once again at the recent Central Committee meeting where the documents to be presented at the 10th PCE Congress were examined. Out of the 51 amendments to the bylaws which I submitted none of the basic ones were approved--neither the federal structure, nor the autonomy of the organizations, nor the respect of minorities, nor the proposal to democratize the internal elections, nor that involving a better organization of the party, a more rational one that would not be hamstrung and stymied by outdated structures, nor, naturally, the far-reaching shakeup of the cadres to project a renewed and modern image for the party. None of these proposals were accepted.

And what is worse, there exists in the PCE a certain situation, a clear tendency toward the pigeonholing and separation of the party's younger elements.

[Question] And would it not have been worth while for you to wait and see how the 10th Congress would turn out and to strive to promote your theses there?

[Answer] No. To continue in this way did not make any sense because the rules pertaining to the formation of delegations are such that all the votes will go to Santiago Carrillo's people. Furthermore, everything has a limit when it comes to waiting and my decision to leave the party is the logical outcome of a hopeless situation.

For Tamames, Santiago Carrillo is the major reason--what with his attitude favoring the growth of a personality cult--for his resignation. According to the deputy mayor of Madrid, Carrillo at this time has lost his role as an arbiter within the PCE and has become merely the head of the Carrillo faction, the only faction, incidentally, tolerated in the party. The others are doomed to extinction, without redemption apart from Carrillo and his sidekicks, who for Tamames are the last vestiges of the JSU [Unified Socialist Youth] which went out of existence in 1939.

[Question] At this time how would you characterize Santiago Carrillo and his role in your own resignation decision?

[Answer] Carrillo is a completely absorbing individual who has managed to have the party organs transformed into simple rubber stamp councils for the secretary general. They already lack the slightest creative dynamism and serve merely to legitimize the personal decisions of the secretary general's egocentric policy.

Even though Ramon Tamames refused to mention what his future plans would be, now outside the PCE, it is obvious that in some way or other he will continue in politics, possibly in his seat as deputy, now in the ranks of the mixed group in the Congress of Deputies.

Finally, regarding some harsh comments, highly critical of Tamames, made by the leader Jaime Ballesteros--possible "heir-apparent" of Carrillo--Ramon Tamames told DIARIO 16 that these comments were not worth dignifying with a response.

2662

CSO: 3110/113

CAMACHO COMMENTS ON TAMAMES RESIGNATION

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 11 May 81 p 6

[Article by Francisco Mora]

[Text] Barcelona--Marcelino Camacho has expressed the opinion that the resignation of Ramon Tamames from the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] is possibly due to the fact that "he may have seen his political career truncated at a given level and he seeks other horizons where an alternative path may be opening up."

The secretary general of the CCOO [Workers Commissions] also told DIARIO 16 that "the normal thing would have been for him to fight to the end. Why did he not wait for the [10th PCE] Congress and bring up his problems there?", an assertion which Camacho also made at length about the "Paco priest," Garcia Salve, about whom he affirmed that "it is possible that he may have confused multitude with assembly."

Responding to the charge of dictatorship of the gerontocracy which Tamames made against the PCE, Camacho asserted that "the president of the United States, that of Germany, as well as other world political leaders are beyond their 60's."

The trade union leader said that in his opinion the PCE today is, in contrast to other periods when it was impenetrable, an open party in which people express themselves freely, "in contrast to what both Tamames and Garcia Salve try to make one believe."

2662

CSO: 3110/113

LIBYAN MILITARY TRAINING AFFAIR DEBATED IN RIKSDAG

Report Censures Burenstam-Linder

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 May 81 p 10

[Reportage by Magdalena Ribbing: "VPK Votes 'Saved' Söder"]

[Text] It was only former Minister of Trade Staffan Burenstam-Linder that was censured by the Riksdag in the Telub affair. It was two VPK [Left Party Communists] votes that gave that somewhat sensational turn to the voting. Karin Söder (C [Center Party]), Eric Krönmark (M [Conservative Party]), and Hadar Cars (FP [Liberal Party]) were thus exonerated by the Riksdag.

With a contribution from the Liberal Party member Olle Wästberg, the Social Democrats won the vote in the Riksdag late Wednesday evening [20 May], so that Staffan Burenstam Linder will go down in history with the stigma of misfeasance in office.

When Speaker Ingemund Bengtsson took the chair in the chamber about an hour before midnight Wednesday, the members of the Riksdag began to wander into the chamber, where they gathered in small groups and chatted while the last contributions to the debate on censure were being made. Though not on the list of speakers, Hans Gustafsson, leader of the Social Democratic Riksdag group took the rostrum.

"We Social Democrats feel that the non-socialist parties must take the consequences of the harsh criticism. The cabinet ministers who are exposed to the criticism of the Riksdag have not met the demands that the Riksdag and the citizens have a right to make on their foremost political representatives. It would be an obvious disrespect for the Riksdag's decision if any minister that is under criticism should be included in the new government that is to be presented on Friday [22 May]," Hans Gustafsson said on behalf of the Social Democrats.

By that he meant that the only minister that clearly could be in the new Fälldin government of the three who according to previously announced plans were to be censured, namely Eric Krönmark (M), Staffan Burenstam Linder (M), and Karin Söder (C), should not get to be included.

Surprised

There was an immediate exchange of words concerning this Social Democratic viewpoint. Daniel Tarschys (FP) observed that Hans Gustafsson had found new constitutional principles, and Bertil Fiskesjö (C) expressed surprise that Hans Gustafsson "lent himself to such unworthy maneuvering."

But then the question of getting a censured minister out of a newly formed cabinet did not arise, since when it came to a vote the Riksdag, to the surprise of many, voted for the Committee on the Constitution's view that neither Karin Söder nor Eric Krönmark should be censured.

The voting came out 164 ayes and 162 nays in favor of both of them.

On the other hand, the Riksdag voted against Staffan Burenstam Linder by a vote of 164 nays, which means that he now has a Riksdag censure on his record.

Angry Riksdag Debate

Stockholm DAGESN NYHETER in Swedish 21 May 81 p 10

[Reportage by Magdalena Ribbing]

[Text] Harsh words were exchanged in the Riksdag chamber when the Telub affair was debated for many hours Wednesday [20 May]. The Left Party Communists unexpectedly demanded that the Liberal minister Hadar Cars be specially censured.

That in addition to the fact that the Social Democrats want to censure Karin Söder (C), Staffan Burenstam Linder (M), and Eric Krönmark (M).

The Liberal Party's Olle Wästberg, who had pushed the Telub affair in the Riksdag and had told the press several days in advance that he was thinking of voting against his party line, had gotten a good scolding from the Liberal Party's Riksdag group the day before.

"We do not want to read in the evening papers that you are thinking of voting against us," the group told Olle Wästberg.

Inflated

But Olle Wästberg stuck to his guns in the Riksdag debate. Telub is one of the postwar period's biggest scandals, he said. He would very much like to see a law passed against training soldiers from foreign powers, a law more or less like the one prohibiting the export of war materiel.

Olle Wästberg's purpose in pushing the Telub affair was to stop the training of Libyan soldiers by Telub in Växjö, but that purpose has not been achieved thus far, he pointed out.

Jörn Svensson (VPK) expressed the view that the Telub question has been inflated to unreasonable proportions in the mass media. It is no Swedish Watergate, he said. Nor is there any objection in principle to Swedish concerns' concluding contracts concerning training services with countries of the Third World. But

Sweden will not export war materiel to Libya, and a parallel should be drawn there.

Conscience

"Some of the most prominent critics of the Telub affair are typical examples of the thermostat conscience," said Jörn Svensson. "Their conscience functions when it is politically suitable, but cuts off with unfailing automation when it no longer fits in."

Hadar Cars, who was minister of trade during the Liberal Party government of 1978-1979, is especially responsible, Jörn Svensson suggested, thus noting a different view from that of the Social Democrats' reservation to the Committee on the Constitution's report, which forms the basis for the debate in the Riksdag (the censure debate).

"The purpose of not censuring the Liberal Party minister is to make it easier for a Liberal Party deserter to vote with the Social Democrats' reservation," said Jörn Svensson.

Repeated

Special censure can also be directed against the minister of trade in the two preceding Fälldin governments, Staffan Burenstam Linder (M), who has admitted that he gave incomplete information to the chamber. That cannot have been unintentional and it cannot be excused, the VPK says, and it introduced a special motion on the Riksdag's censure of Hadar Cars and Staffan Burenstam Linder.

All of the three non-socialist governments that handled the Telub affair should also be censured, according to the VPK.

Olle Wästberg said in the debate that he would not vote for VPK's demand for censure of Hadar Cars, who did try to block Telub's contract with Libya, albeit without success. But Olle Wästberg repeated that he meant to vote for the Social Democrats' demand for censure of Karin Söder, Staffan Burenstam Linder, and Eric Krönmark.

Wretched Game

"Olle Wästberg is playing along in the wretched but well-directed game the Social Democrats are playing," said Center Party member Sven-Erik Nordin, who defended Karin Söder completely. "It is not easy to find favor with the Social Democrats," he went on to say, "but they must look out for backlashes."

"The Social Democrats feel that the non-socialist governments had a clear idea what kind of training was being done by Telub," said Olle Svensson (S), who is one of the seven Social Democrats in the Committee on the Constitution. The committee also has three Conservatives, three members of the Center Party, and two members of the Liberal Party, but, like the other committees, nobody from the VPK.

"That should change now," Nils Berndtson (VPK) said in his speech. Olle Svensson felt that the bourgeois were serving parliamentarism ill.

Hypocrisy

"The Telub management was prepared to abstain from any further dealings with Libya if only the government as a whole had given advice to that effect," said Olle

Svensson. "But no such advice was forthcoming. The chance was thrown away. And after that the government's lack of courage to stand up for its own measures is unpardonable.

"The Riksdag must speak out strongly when this sort of picture of the internal workings of the government is revealed," he asserted.

The Conservative Anders Björck felt that it was all the Social Democrats' fault. The Palme government had received the Libyan prime minister Jalloud on an official visit and concluded an agreement on cooperation with consultant services and training and what not.

"The Social Democrats' reservation is stamped with hypocrisy," said Anders Björck. "And Olle Wästberg is only concerned with party tactics."

Cursorily Informed

"I am not any such thing," Olle Wästberg said from the speaker's chair.

Later in the debate Olle Svensson (S) explained why the Social Democrats had not demanded that Thorbjörn Fälldin be censured as being responsible for the government.

"We have not directed so much criticism against Fälldin; we know that he was only cursorily informed, some time when they were having a cup of coffee."

On the other hand, the Social Democrat Hilding Johansson, former chairman of the Committee on the Constitution, said in another part of the censure debate that the three-party government had never acted as a unit, as it should have done:

"The government is a unit and it is supposed to be held together by the prime minister."

Secret

But it did not function that way, said Hilding Johansson:

"In the three-party government there were even requests to make secret reservations to the minutes of cabinet meetings, or at least joking remarks about such things." (Hilding Johansson was alluding to Gösta Bohman, who wanted to enter a reservation to his own supplementary finance plan.)

"We must take care lest we get a reservation parliamentarism. The Committee on the Constitution's review of the government reveals various oppositions between the parties which have resulted in slow decision-making. The bench seems to be the second Fälldin government's favorite piece of furniture," said Hilding Johansson.

He also introduced a new concept in politics: Fälldin parliamentarism, which he said was a weakening of parliamentarism and led to a political crisis.

"The prime minister and the government have collective responsibility for the decisions that are made," said Hilding Johansson.

But Daniel Tarschys (FP) said that it was valuable to have differences of view in the government. It should not be a unicolored monolith, he said. And Bertil Fiskesjö (C), the chairman of the Committee on the Constitution, said that the Social Democrats' criticism was woodpecker politics:

"When they peck at the non-socialist ministers it is only out of disappointment that they are not in the government themselves."

The vote on censure or no censure of four ministers took place late Wednesday evening.

Paper Comments on Report

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 May 81 p 2

[Editorial by Caris Stenström: "Telub Before the Riksdag"]

[Text] The Committee on the Constitution's obligation to give a non-partisan review of the government's discharge of its duties is a task beyond the power of the parties, as was shown with exemplary clarity when the Riksdag discussed the Telub affair yesterday. It is obviously impossible to disregard party tactics and concentrate on the question of whether the prime minister or the government have performed their duties in a constitutionally correct manner. Neither the committee's non-socialist majority nor its Social Democratic minority coped with the job. Neither, unfortunately, did the central figure in the debate, the FP maverick Olle Wästberg. He chose to vote for censure of the ministers Söder, Krönmark, and Burenstam Linder, but not of Hadar Cars, minister of trade in the FP government, i.e. the government that gave the all-clear signal for the affair.

Nor can we concur in Jörn Svensson's (VPK) claim of greater effort toward impartiality. Partisanism shines through what Svensson said in a sometimes painful way.

The debate yesterday followed earlier paths. The non-socialist majority, represented chiefly by Anders Björck (M) and Sven-Erik Nordin (C), dismissed criticism of Karin Söder, Erik Krönmark, and Staffan Burenstam Linder with the old explanation that they had not been properly informed, that they were misled by the Telub management. As a diversive maneuver, both Björck and Nordin dwelled long and penetratingly on the cooperative agreement that the Social Democratic government entered into with Libya in 1974, in spite of the fact that that was not the subject of the constitutional review. For Olle Wästberg it was the foreign-policy considerations that weighed most heavily.

The Social Democrats this time were strongly critical of the whole non-socialist governments' handling of the Telub question, and demanded specific censure of Karin Söder, Erik Krönmark, and Staffan Burenstam Linder. When the Committee on the Constitution dealt with the question last year, on the basis of largely factual material, the criticism was milder and pertained only to the confusion and lack of clarity that marked the handling of the affair.

But if the debate produced mostly confusion and smoke screens, the committee's report on the affair is all the more clarifying. It is apparent there that, as is already well known, both Söder and Krönmark were informed at an early stage concerning the project and its military connection. Their failure to take any

measures is open to criticism from the point of view of practical policy, but hardly to constitutional censure, since affairs of that kind are not unlawful. On the other hand, there should be discussion of the fact that for a long time they furnished incorrect information to the public.

The committee also finds that Burenstam Linder did not answer correctly to questions in the Riksdag. However, it accepts the implausible explanation that the minister was quite unsuspectingly misled--in spite of the fact that the real truth was clear to most people at that time.

An interesting item of information in the report is that Thorbjörn Fälldin, then prime minister in his second government, told the Israeli ambassador in December 1979 that the training was of military interest and concerned military personnel. There were thus persons in the government and at a high level that knew that Burenstam Linder was giving incorrect information in the Riksdag and allowed that to occur without discussion.

The outcome of the Riksdag vote, which had not been completed when this was written, will probably be that non-socialist ministers Karin Söder, Erik Krönmark, and Staffan Burenstam Linder are censured for their actions. Beyond the annoyance that will have no obvious consequences. In all likelihood Karin Söder will be included on the list of ministers that Thorbjörn Fälldin presents tomorrow.

The Telub affair is probably not over. The government's own investigation has not yet been completed, but in view of the fact that the investigative committee recruited people from the Committee on the Constitution, it is not likely to reach any conclusions that draw particular attention. In Växjö, Telub is continuing the training, or at least the civilian part. Olle Wästberg's contribution to the debate Wednesday indicates that this will not be allowed to take place quietly.

But parallel to the Telub debate we need another debate--on how we can get a non-partisan and impartial review of the highest authority of the realm. That is far more important.

Communists: MP Violates Line

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 May 81 p 10

[Reportage by Kaa Lneberg]

[Text] The VPK coup in the Riksdag vote on the Telub affair aroused troubled feelings in the party the day after. The two VPK'ers that changed sides went against the party's majority decision. The better-known of the mavericks, Jörn Svensson, says: "There are limits to loyalty."

"In its investigation of the government's and the ministers' performance of their duties--the so-called censures--the Riksdag is a court and we members of the Riksdag are judges. For that reason the investigation shall be purely legal and not political."

"The judges" will take a position on how the matter under consideration was handled legally, not how it was decided from the purely political point of view.

So argues Jörn Svensson, the debate-ready member of the Riksdag for the VPK. Late Wednesday evening [20 May] he and his fellow party member Oswald Söderqvist voted with the bourgeois members against censure of Karin Söder and Eric Krönberg. They voted contrary to the VPK Riksdag group's majority decision.

"But my criticism was of the Social Democrats' purely tactical game which is in conflict with the party's own line," Jörn Svensson told DAGENS NYHETER Thursday.

"They were playing a dangerous game with the 'Israel lobby.'"

During Thursday Jörn Svensson defended his action in the Riksdag group and elsewhere by reading selected parts of Holmberg-Stjernquist's interpretation of the basic situation.

"It says here clearly and explicitly that the censure will be a juridical review. It is the procedures that are to be examined, not the policy. Policy can be criticized in all other debates."

Jörn Svensson says that during the last few years censure has degenerated into a purely partisan political showdown between the parties.

"Purely as a matter of principle I CONSIDER IT UNREASONABLE TO CALL Karin Söder and Eric Krönmark to account for wrong handling of the Telub affair. They were brought into it before the agreement was entered into."

"The Conservatives' Staffan Burenstam Linder should not be censured for the agreement--he tried to change it, in fact--but he should be for having misled the Riksdag in the debates."

His own disobedience of the party he defends by saying that he presented his views in the Riksdag group.

"Afterwards the right not to vote with the group was denied."

He points out that a politician must go as far as he can to be loyal to his party. But there is a limit to party loyalty.

"The party cannot stand above the state. That happens in both east and west, and none of the examples invites imitation," says Jörn Svensson.

'Rebellion Prohibited'

A troubled mood prevailed Thursday in the VPK's Riksdag group after two of its members, Jörn Svensson and Oswald Söderqvist, had unexpectedly refused late Wednesday evening to support the Social Democrats' call for censure of the Center Party minister Karin Söder and former defense minister Eric Krönmark (M) in the Telub affair.

The two VPK'ers' action conflicted with a majority decision in the Riksdag group that they would support the Social Democrats' censure demand after the VPK's demand was voted down.

Among the Social Democrats disappointment prevailed. Hans Gustafsson, the group leader, admitted that he felt quite let down--to have Karin Söder censured and at the same time appointed minister in the new Fälldin government.

"I was informed by the Left Party Communists through group leader Nils Berndtson that they intended to vote for the Social Democratic demand. Otherwise I would never have gone up to the rostrum before the voting," Hans Gustafsson told DAGENS NYHETER.

He said in the speech that he regarded it as improper to have censured ministers in a government. He consoled himself Thursday with the fact that he had never mentioned Karin Söder by name.

In the VPK the desertion was discussed heatedly all day in various party bodies. In the morning the "deserter" Jörn Svensson was present in the executive committee. The other who departed from the party line was Oswald Söderquist.

Erik Forsberg, the party secretary, sat in the party's coffee room before the meeting and muttered that "such a thing as this should not happen."

"Among us as in other parties a majority decision should be respected."

Bertil Måbrink, vice chairman of the group, was of the same opinion; at the various meetings of the day he wanted to have it established that in the future, too, votes will be taken in substantive matters.

He said that the two deserters had broken an old democratic rule in the party by their action. After the majority of the VPK's Riksdag group had decided to support the Social Democratic reservation the four members announced a divergent opinion--that they would abstain from voting. That was voted on, too, but the majority voted against it. The whole group should vote for the reservation, was the opinion.

Within the VPK group there were also several who acknowledged general disappointment, as they would really have liked to do as Svensson and Söderquist did.

In the afternoon there was a hot debate in the party's confidential council and later in the party's Riksdag group. All of the VPK meetings had been announced earlier, i.e., were not called because of the incident, but they were dominated by Wednesday's events.

Former party leader C.-H. Hermansson did not take it quite so seriously and indicated that he had experienced worse quarrels in the party.

"No reprisals are being considered," Måbrink said, "but we must discuss thoroughly what rules shall prevail."

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STATUS OF TURKISH-SYRIAN RELATIONS REVIEWED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 8 Jun 81 pp 1, 9

[Article by Cengiz Candar and Sedat Ergin]

[Text] 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the number two man in Syria, the neighbor with whom Turkey shares the longest border, is coming to Ankara tomorrow. Thus, an official visit on the foreign minister level will have come to pass for the first time in 8 years between the only Middle Eastern member of NATO and the Soviet's closest regional ally.

Syria is perhaps the Arab nation with the most vivid memories of Turkey. There is a square with a fountain-decorated pool that is located right in the middle of Damascus, which served for hundreds of years as an Ottoman provincial capital. The city's main street--today called 29 May Street--stretches from this square, at the rear of which stands the magnificent Central Bank building, to the Hejaz Station. The Syrians remember World War I Navy Minister and Fourth Army Commander Cemal Pasha by having erected columns at 10 meter intervals along this one-and-a-half kilometer street....

Despite the sort of memories that do not promote rapprochement between the two countries, the eye is transfixed in the immediate vicinity of the Hejaz Station by twin minarets and the Suleymaniye Mosque, imbued with the typical characteristics of Ottoman architecture. This mosque, built by the architect Sinan in the 1550's, creates the impression of being in a Turkish city and is like an indelible memorial to Turkish-Arab historical and cultural partnership.

An important psychological factor that generates both closeness and distance between Turks and Syrians revolves around the roots of President Hafiz al-Asad himself. Syrians remind their Turkish friends that the'r presidents come from Kordag. Kordag is the name Syrians give the region that stretches from the southern part of the Hatay to the Syrian coastal city of Lattakia.

Syria's Alawi minority is concentrated particularly in this region. Segments of some families currently living in this region are Turkish citizens while other segments are Syrian citizens. It is known that Hafiz Al'Asad's relatives still reside in the Hatay....

This phenomenon, which could be a vehicle for close relations between the two peoples, is at the same time one of the reasons for chilled relations. The seeds of the Ba'th

Party of which Hafiz al-Asad is the leader, were sown in the Society To Save the Hatay. This society developed over time and played a role in the Ba'th Party's founding. The Hatay is still shown on Syrian maps as Syrian territory. Nonetheless, although Syrian leaders have not renounced their claims to the Hatay in the ideological sphere, they state in official talks that they harbor no design with regard to this region. The intervening chilled relations that in recent history stem from the Hatay problem have become even worse in light of these countries belonging to inimical political alliance systems and having mutually exclusive military ties. Although Syria, while struggling with Israel to the south, makes no secret of its edginess over U.S. bases in Turkey to the north, Turkey, as a member in an alliance to counter its powerful Soviet neighbor to the north, is not pleased that the Soviets are the most important regional support for its southern neighbor with whom it shares the longest border.

It is a widespread conviction that Syria is by no means at peace with itself. It is believed the radical leftist Syrian regime harbors a hard and intransigent attitude toward the West. But a 24-hour period spent in the capital, Damascus, readily exposes the invalidity of this opinion. The giant hotels like the Sheridan, Meridian and Damascus Grand Hotel that rise in various places in a 6,000-year-old city that contains traditional Arab-Islamic architecture.... And the heavy traffic of American, German and French businessmen in the lobbies of these hotels may give a clue to the fact that Syria's face is turned toward the West.

Moreover, the web of nightclubs that envelops downtown Damascus and employs young girls (especially Thais and Filipinos), the luxury consumer items that decorate the display windows of stores along Abu Rumanah Street (the Beyoglu of Damascus), and the chic men and women one can see in large numbers at any time on the sidewalks all give evidence of the fact that Syria is by no means as hard-nosed a country as believed on the outside.

Syria's turning its face to the West is the product of the Hafiz al-Asad period. Hafiz al-Asad has been in power for 11 years. He thus has brought Syria the most stable period in its history by erasing Syria's title as the "recordholder for military coups" held from the time it gained full independence in 1946 until 1970. With al-Asad the private sector, which experienced the nationalization policy of the 1960's, has breathed comfortably. One of the most significant decisions of the last Ba'th Party Congress in December 1979 was the resolution to support the private sector.

Anyway, import-export figures shed light on Syria's real course. Three EEC countries--West Germany, Italy and France--are the top three exporters to Syria. The United States is in seventh place. The Soviet Union, Syria's ally, is not even among the top ten. West Germany, France and the Soviet Union are the top three importers of Syrian goods. The United States ranks fifth and Greece seventh.

Turkey is way at the bottom of this list. Syria is not like Turkey's other neighbors in the Islamic world; it is not an oil producer like Iran and Iraq. Therefore, Syria is not indispensable from an economic and commercial standpoint. Nevertheless, the Turkish-Syrian talks slated for Khaddam's visit, which starts tomorrow, are of no mean importance.

BRIEFS

PLO REPRESENTATIVE CLARIFIES STATEMENT--Political Bureau Chief Faruq Qaddumi, who represented the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Islamic Nations Foreign Ministers Conference, asked to speak with Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen on the side. He said to Turkmen, "My statement regarding refugees was misinterpreted. We have good relations with Turkey, and we sincerely want to continue." Faruq Qaddumi in answering an ANKA (Ankara News Agency) reporter's question said the following: "I spoke with your esteemed foreign minister because I learned that a speech I gave earlier had been misinterpreted. I explained to him that my statement in this speech referred only to Palestinians. My statement that all refugees must return to their homes had only the Palestinian refugees in mind. However, the Greek-Cypriot press, in misinterpreting, ran commentaries as though my words had been directed at the Greek-Cypriots. I believe that our relation with Turkey, with whom we have always had good relations, will continue with even greater sincerity." In a speech given earlier, Faruq Qaddumi reportedly said, "All refugees must return to their homes. And an indemnity should be exacted from those who do not return." Qaddumi's words, however, were interpreted by the Greek-Cypriot press to refer to Greek-Cypriots. [Text] [Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 5 Jun 81 p 3]

ITALY DELIVERS TWO MISSILE CORVETTES TO LIBYA

Rome IL BORGHESE in Italian 19 Apr 81 p 987

[Article by Miles: "Libyan Corsairs 'Made in Italy'"]

[Text] Last March 27 at the Muggiano naval yards in La Spezia two multipurpose missile corvettes ordered by the Tripoli government through the Cantieri Navali Riuniti were turned over to Libyan Col Yabu Hussen.

The two units commissioned by Libya, called Wadi Magrawa and Wadi Marseat, were the third and fourth vessels of the Wadi Mragh class. They were turned over to the Libyans completely outfitted.

The vessels of this class have begun to be manufactured to satisfy the desires of "emerging nations" wishing to create a "respectable" fleet but due to economic factors and lack of trained personnel, are not able to purchase and maintain 2,000-3,000 ton frigates.

A selling point of the Wadi Mragh class is that it can be modified to suit the needs of a wide variety of potential buyers. In fact, the only fixed items are the hull structure and the unit's structure. All the rest is changeable, from the weapons systems to crew quarters.

Missions required of the corvettes, in general terms, are the following: attack and interdiction missions against units of similar capabilities as well as general military shipping; offensive operations against enemy surface units and against enemy shipping lanes; antisubmarine defense as well as hunter-killer antisubmarine operations; antimissile and antiaircraft defense; rapid mine-laying operations.

The diesel propulsion unit, which consists of four MTU-MA 16V 956 TB 91 engines, was chosen in light of the corvette's likely theater of operations. The motors permit the unit an average speed of 31.5 knots and a maximum speed of 34 knots.

Countries purchasing the corvettes are all developing countries and for the most part are located in hot climates. Delicate gasoline turbines would not be well suited to the hot climates of Africa or South America. Furthermore, it should be noted that to keep these diesel engines running and maintained is much easier for those countries that are unable to hire European crews or sending their own crews to the Italian Naval Academy.

With regard to training personnel, however, Cantieri Navali Riuniti has provided a program by which the crews to be assigned to these corvettes are trained at La Spezia in accordance with agreements signed by both governments.

The weaponry is as sophisticated and lethal as any on board vessels of this kind. It consists of a compact OTO MELARA 76-mm cannon, two triple ILAS-3 antisubmarine torpedo launchers, four container/launchers for OTOMAT antiship missiles and a twin 35-mm Oerlikon turret in addition to the two mine-laying ramps.

The above is the basic armament configuration for the unit, similar to the ships chosen by Libya.

For the other units, ordered by Ecuador (6) and by Iraq (6), the armament configurations range from a helicopter landing platform (such as the multirole function of the Wadi Mragh) all the way to a configuration which includes a cluster of six antiship missile launcher/containers.

The on-board electronics component, which is very sophisticated and totally centralized, allows the destruction of enemy targets swiftly and with precision, in the air as well as under water.

An item considered by us to be of some importance, given the purchasers of the vessels, is the fact that these ships are capable of operating in zones contaminated with radiation.

At this point, the words spoken by Libyan Col Yabu Hussen when the ships were consigned appear paradoxical: "The scope of the Libyan revolution is primarily that of defense in order to collaborate for peace in the Mediterranean, and for this reason these vessels are effective instruments of peace."

Perhaps it is for defensive motives that presently in Libya one finds Russian-built MIG-25 aircraft and Mirage jets, each capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapons. Perhaps it is in the name of detente that Libya, thanks to the Russians, has created the largest depot of armored vehicles in all of North Africa? Or perhaps Qadhafi might want to use the corvettes to go on vacation to Pantelleria, presently considered Tripoli's offensive base against NATO's southern flank?

Certainly the fishers of Mazara del Vallo must have been ecstatic with joy when they heard that the Libyans now have four units of the type described above, with crews trained in Italy. After having been killed, plundered and sunk in the past by foreign naval units, in the future they will have the honor of being captured by units built in La Spezia and manned by crews trained by our Navy, with Italian taxpayer's funds.

EUROGROUP's Military Expenses

In 1981, the countries that make up Eurogroup (which include all NATO members except the U.S., France and Canada) will acquire weapons and defense materiel according to the following figures. Eurogroup has recently set up an operational committee to which the armaments director generals of each country's Ministry of

Defense belong. The operational committee has also been assigned the task of drawing up industrial plans for the manufacturing of weapons.

Country	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Italy	13.1	15.3	16.2	15.1	18.3
Great Britain	20.6	22.0	23.0	23.2	24.1
Germany	13.2	12.5	13.0	13.7	14.2
Turkey	28.5	21.9	18.5	9.5	6.1
Belgium	11.0	11.9	13.9	13.1	13.6
Denmark	19.4	21.8	16.4	16.3	15.4
Netherlands	15.5	20.9	18.3	20.1	19.7
Norway	11.4	14.2	17.2	18.9	17.0
Portugal	1.9	2.1	1.8	3.8	6.7

9209

CSO: 3104/270

DEFENSE MINISTER DEFENDS NEED FOR LISTENING POSTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 May 81 p 16

[Article by Inge D. Hassen: "Defense Minister Stoltenberg Says, 'The Need for Listening Posts Has Increased'"]

[Text] "Through NATO, we have obtained guarantees that we will get assistance if we ask for it. There is little we can do in return for those guarantees. Listening and direction-finding stations therefore constitute an important contribution by Norway," said Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund while giving evidence in the Gleditsch case yesterday. Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg said that the need for such stations has become greater because activities in the northern region are increasing.

Frydenlund emphasized the fact that the stations are under Norwegian control and that their existence has contributed to a lowering of tension in the northern region.

"If we had not carried out that activity ourselves, the big powers would certainly have carried it out in our vicinity. If that were the case, it could increase the tensions," said the foreign minister.

In response to a question from the counsel for the defense, Supreme Court attorney Ole Jakob Bae, as to whether the intelligence service would be weakened if we had more outspokenness, Frydenlund replied: "I regard anything which can contribute to the weakening of that service as harmful. We rely upon having an effective intelligence service. In a critical situation, it is advantageous to get information on what is about to happen. Purely theoretically, I am in favor of greater outspokenness, but where the intelligence service is concerned we must hold back a little."

Defense Minister Stoltenberg stressed the fact that the intelligence service is especially vulnerable, and he expressed it as his opinion that Norway follows the same line as the other Nordic countries and the NATO countries where the degree of outspokenness concerning that service is concerned. "I do not know of any country which is willing to make information regarding its intelligence service public," said Stoltenberg.

Supreme Court Attorney Bae said, "But in Turkey they are entirely outspoken concerning the same listening and direction-finding stations about which we preserve secrecy."

Stoltenberg replied: "There is an essential difference between the two cases because the stations in Turkey are manned by Americans. For us, it has been a matter of basic principle that the stations should be under full Norwegian control."

The defense minister thinks it is important to repudiate the misdealing to which the stations have been subjected. "In my opinion," Stoltenberg said, "the activity which is carried on by the stations forms the basis for the Armed Forces' most important mission, which is to prevent war." Yesterday afternoon, the court went to inspect one of the stations which is located in the vicinity of Oslo. The case will be continued tomorrow with the examination of additional witnesses.

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GOLCUK YARD HISTORY, OPERATIONS EXAMINED

Istanbul 8. GUN in Turkish 3 May 81 pp 5,6

[Article by Mustafa Bagdiken]

[Text] The Golcuk Shipyard, whose name is today inscribed with honor among the top of the highly-regarded shipyards, was established in 1924 in order to repair the Yavuz, a damaged ship of our worn-out fleet.

At that time, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk roared like thunder, proclaiming:

"An extensive and important portion of our border is surrounded by water. The naval force of the Republic of Turkey must be large and powerful. A productive fleet will be put into shape within a short time with the renovation of those ships for which this is feasible from among the units that are relics of the past."

These words marked a course to be followed, and a floating dock with a holding capacity of 28,000 tons was constructed at Golcuk, the most appropriate site. In this way, the foundation was also laid for the Golcuk Shipyard Commandant.

Prior to World War II, development projects for the shipyard were drawn up. They were not, however, carried out because of the war. Following the war, modernization work was continued, and, in 1942, construction of machine, foundry, model, and hull factories was completed.

Today, more than 100 experienced officers and engineers are assigned to the Golcuk Shipyard, which employs 5,000 workers at the 1,300-unit major ship-building yard.

With two shipbuilding construction sheds measuring 150 by 24 meters and 80 by 20 meters and with floating docks able to hold 28,000 tons, every type of military and commercial ship up to 30,000 dwt is being built at the Golcuk Shipyard.

In 1962, maintenance and renovation of our submarines and destroyers, which had previously been sent to the United States for general maintenance, began to be carried out at the Golcuk Shipyard.

Golcuk Shipyard workers and engineers, who built the patrol vessel, the TCG [Republic of Turkey ship] Kochisar, in 1965, later launched two companion frigates, the TCG Peyk and the TCG Berk. During ensuing years, liquid-fuel tankers of various tonnages and landing craft were constructed. The Golcuk Shipyard, which moved the keel of the first Turkish-built submarine, the Yildiray, into a construction shed in 1975, became a source of pride for Turks. The Yildiray is a type-209, 1,000-ton, "Ay"-class submarine whose modern underwater torpedoes rank only behind those of atomic submarines. In 1980, the TCG Yildiray was lowered into the sea to join the navy. The same year, construction was begun on facilities that could build both warships and "Ay"-class submarines. It has been reported that these facilities will be put into service at the end of 1981. The excess Golcuk Shipyard labor force and facility capacity will be utilized in ship construction for private enterprise and public organizations through the channels of circulating capital. The "Chief Engineers' Project Development Office," which was established in 1975, determines naval forces' needs and ensures that design and prototype manufacturing methods are developed for electronic systems and artillery control systems, which, in past years, were obtained through foreign purchases using a great deal of foreign exchange.

Orders from Foreign Countries

The Golcuk Shipyard, which constructs ships for the Turkish Navy and the nation's commercial fleet, is also receiving orders from its friends and Muslim nations. The Golcuk Shipyard, which renovates submarines and warships for those countries, recently completed nine of the personnel landing craft that it is building for Libya. By July, 16 more of these ships will be completed. The electronics workshops of the shipyard have manufactured, to date, electronic apparatus that are used in 18 different fields. In the meantime, the missile control system, the "Sapan A/K," developed by Turkish engineers has earned the admiration of foreign experts.

Sheds Never Empty

The giant facilities of the Golcuk Shipyard are never empty, not even for a moment. Its 5,000 employees are busy as bees working under the slogan, "Your ships, built by you."

At this time, work continues at the Golcuk Shipyard on the construction and fitting out of another type-209, 1,000-ton submarine, Turkey's fifth "Ay"-class submarine and a mate of the TCG Yildiray, which joined our naval fleet in 1980, and on the Bursa, a mate to the 18,000-dwt ore carrier, the Balikesir, which was transferred to the Maritime Bank Sea Transport Corporation in March 1981. In addition, the 5,500-dwt Konya, a coaster-container ship for the same corporation and two LCT-type tank-landing craft,

which are being built for the naval fleet, are being fitted out. Meanwhile, shipyard officials stated that construction of a floating dock with a holding capacity of 4,500 tons is almost completed. This will also increase the shipyard's capabilities.

The Golcuk Shipyard, the unextinguishable torch of the honored past of yesterday's navy and today's naval forces and a modern and powerful symbol of our heavy industrialization, is the cause for the pride that swells the chests of the Turkish people.

11673

CSO: 4907/260

CHANGES MADE IN COURT PROCEDURE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 29 Apr 81 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara--A law bill that includes changes in the Civil Procedures Law introduces important new statutes. It is reported that the bill, which has been placed on the Council of Ministers' agenda and which, after being discussed there, will be submitted to the National Security Council, is being drafted in order to speed up court procedures. Some of the amendments are, in summary:

[1.] A change in Article 275 of the law will do away with "the necessity to seek expert advice in cases that can be solved with the general, legal knowledge required of the judicial profession."

Another amendment dealing with the same article stipulates that, when a case is sent to an expert, the experts' report must be presented within 3 months.

A proposed change would make it compulsory to open a case with the plaintiff's documents. An amendment to Article 195 would require that evidence be presented at the time a defendant makes his initial plea. The defendant would add the documents to the covering memorandum of the plea as if the plea had been refuted.

[2.] A change in Article 7 of the law deals with the topic of whether or not an issue comes under the jurisdiction of a court. Under the law that is now in effect, it is only possible for a judge to decide that he is "unqualified" to try a case after holding a hearing. The amendment would lift this requirement, and the judge would be given the authority to decide that he is "unqualified" without a hearing. For example, in a suit for divorce opened in a minor court for petty offenses, the judge would be able to decide whether or not he has jurisdiction without a hearing.

[3.] An amendment to Article 8 that is being sought would raise the limit from the current 5,000 liras to 25,000 liras in cases heard before the minor court for petty offenses.

[4.] Articles 33, 34, 35, and 36 of the Civil Procedures Law deal with "rejection of the judge." Changes made previously in Criminal Procedures Law No 1,402 are being carried over to the civil procedures law as well.

Statutes are being introduced to prevent wasting time or delaying the case when a judge is dismissed from a case or when such a request is turned down. It is reported that statutes from German criminal law are being used as models and that a correlation between criminal and civil procedures is being established.

[5.] A modification of Article 67 initiates a new statute related to giving the court the power to appoint an attorney. In most cases when a plaintiff or a defendant asks to be "given time" to "retain an attorney," his purpose is to delay the case. The new bill includes a statute to prevent this. It is asserted, however, that the new regulation will not produce a situation such that a right will be lost, but will produce a situation such that a case will be heard promptly.

[6.] The new law bill, by raising the limit, would give judges in civil courts the authority to hear cases involving 5,000 liras rather than 500 liras.

[7.] Likewise, the minimum "affirmable" debt that can be set by a witness would be raised from the current 500 liras to 5,000 liras.

[8.] New regulations have been introduced regarding the issue of appeals to the supreme court. If, for example, in a 20,000-lira compensation case, a judge rules that 15,000 liras be paid and rejects a 5,000-lira portion, the plaintiff would not be able to appeal the decision in order to collect the 5,000 liras. However, if the other party protests the 15,000-lira ruling and goes to the supreme court of appeals, then the plaintiff would be able to raise an objection and also be able to appeal to the supreme court in order to be able to be awarded the 5,000 liras.

[9.] The minimum monetary limit for suits brought before the supreme court of appeals has been raised from 10,000 liras to 50,000 liras.

Furthermore, as with criminal court procedures, appeals will no longer be brought before the civil law general council.

11673

CSO: 4907/264

COSAR OUTLINES HOPES FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 4 May 81 pp 1,7

[Text] Izmir (THA)--Turkish Religious Leaders Federation Chairman Ismail Cosar has requested that compulsory religion classes of at least 2 hours per week be included in the curricula of all grades of primary and middle schools.

Cosar, who came to Izmir to participate in a memorial service held yesterday in the Hisar Mosque for Turkish Labor Attache Resat Morali, who was killed in France by Armenians a while ago, and for religious leader Tecelli Ari, attended the Izmir Society of Religious Leaders' general council meeting where he gave a speech.

Cosar said that the failure to instill, at the proper time, religious and nationalistic feelings in youths played a large role in the development of the dangerous environment that existed in Turkey prior to the 12 September change in government. He continued:

"For this reason, at least 2 hours a week of compulsory religion classes for all grades of elementary and middle schools must be included in the curricula, which are due for complete revision. Concomitant with this, the number of religious leader-preacher lycees, which are the best examples of cooperation between the state and the religious community, must be increased, and the present status of these schools must be preserved. The current shortage of 8,000 religious leaders-preachers also necessitates this."

The chairman general of the Turkish Religious Leaders Federation later spoke on the topic of pilgrimages to Mecca. He said, "The pilgrimage is an act of worship. It is not, as some insist, a trip. Whereas a citizen has been given the right to travel abroad once every 3 years, his right to make the pilgrimage to Mecca has been reduced to once per lifetime. This regulation has been in effect for 2 years now and is the cause for distress."

Cosar pointed out in his speech that problems dealing with the procedure for the promotion of religious leaders have not been able to be resolved at all. He reported that 10,000 of the more-than-30,000 religious leaders have not been able to advance and that the issue has been taken to the Religious Affairs Directorate and the Ministry of State.

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